Campbell Tip of the Month

Author: Clyde Young

  • Process Safety and Low Oil Prices

    In this Tip of the Month, we reflect back to December 2008, and get a reminder from the United States Chemical Safety Board (CSB) to remain focused on process safety and accident prevention during this time of lower oil prices.

    During the economic downturn of 2008, oil prices dropped significantly. The latest drop in crude oil prices is similar. At that time, the CSB produced a video message asking companies to stay focused on process safety. That message is very relevant today.

    Process Safety and Low Oil Prices

    In the past, market conditions have occurred where oil prices have been low, such as we are experiencing today. Corporate cost cutting during these low oil price events have contributed to process safety incidents years later. In 2008, the United States Chemical Safety Board (CSB) Chairman John Bresland provided a reminder to oil companies that it is important to stay focused on process safety, even when prices are low. This was accomplished through a press release and a video safety message that is appropriate for this time [1].

    Low oil prices, combined with striking workers at US refineries increase the challenges faced by managers to insure that process safety is a core value of the organization.

    Containing overhead and operating costs during these market conditions may lead some to take shortcuts and make hasty decisions without considering all the process safety implications of these decisions. The attached press release and video safety message is as appropriate today as it was in 2008. This video message would be an excellent safety moment topic and hopefully will allow us to remain focused on process safety.

    Dec 22, 2008

    In First Video Safety Message, CSB Chairman John Bresland Calls for Industry to Remain Focused on Process Safety, Accident Prevention During Recession

    Washington, DC, December 22, 2008 – In his first video safety message, CSB Chairman John Bresland today said that chemical companies and refineries need to continue to invest in process safety and preventive maintenance, even as the economic downturn cuts into sales and profits.

    The four-minute video message was released on YouTube.com (http://www.youtube.com/safetymessages) and the text was posted on Blogger.com (http://safetymessages.blogspot.com).

    “My safety message for oil and chemical companies is clear: even during economic downturns, spending for needed process safety measures must be maintained,” Chairman Bresland stated in the message. He noted that the CSB investigation of the 2005 Texas City refinery disaster linked the accident to corporate spending decisions in the 1990s, when low oil prices triggered cutbacks in maintenance, training, and operator positions at the plant.

    “Unfortunately, around the country, refinery accidents continue to be a concern,” Chairman Bresland said, pointing to three major accidents that occurred at refineries in Texas this year, including a fire at a refinery in Tyler last month that fatally burned two workers and forced the refinery to shut down for months. “Today, as gasoline prices remain low, companies should weigh each decision to make sure that the safety of plant workers, contractors, and communities is protected.”

    Safety Messages are a new communication tool for the agency, consisting of short videos from the Chairman or the other board members. In the coming weeks and months, new messages will be released on a variety of current issues in chemical process safety.

    “I encourage all of our stakeholders to join the discussion on YouTube.com and Blogger.com and share their thoughts about the subject of these messages,” Chairman Bresland said. Comments and ideas for future Safety Messages can also be emailed to safetymessages@csb.gov.

    The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency’s board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.

    The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Visit our website, www.csb.gov.

    For more information, contact Daniel Horowitz at (202) 261-7613 or Hillary Cohen at (202) 261-3601.

    To learn more about process safety, we suggest attending our PetroSkills HSE course, HS 45- Risk Based Process Safety Management or PS-2, Fundamentals of Process Safety To enhance process safety engineering skills we suggest any of the JMC foundation courses or our, PS 4 – Process Safety Engineering course.

    PetroSkills offers consulting expertise on this subject and many others. For more information about these services, visit our website at http://petroskills.com/consulting, or email us at consulting@PetroSkills.com.

    By: Clyde Young

    Reference:

    1. United States Chemical Safety Board, Press Release, December 22, 2008.

  • The Importance of Leadership in Process Safety Management

    The first pillar of Risk Based Process Safety Management is “Commitment to Process Safety.”  A formalized mentoring system can ensure workforce involvement, compliance with company and regulatory requirements, increase the competency of personnel and enhance the process safety culture of the entire organization.  Within this element there are several essential features that lead to a more effective process safety culture.

    Providing strong leadership is critical for any organization that strives to manage the risk associated with the activities associated with process safety.  Leadership is a skill that is not necessarily intuitive to managers and mentors.  Leadership is a skill that can be learned.

    In this Tip of the Month (TOTM), we explore process safety leadership.

    This TOTM is part of a paper that was developed by John M. Campbell (JMC) Instructor/Consultants Clyde Young and John Kanengieter for presentation at the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) 9th Global Conference on Process Safety [1].

    Over the last several years, significant resources have been devoted to examining the issue of process safety culture, and strong leadership has been cited as a key element to enhance a process safety culture.  Study of major accidents within the oil, gas, chemical and allied industries have found that the safety culture of organizations is often proposed as a contributing factor, and development of a culture of process safety as the solution.  Presentations at symposia and conferences point to enhancing culture and providing leadership as necessary to address breakdowns in process safety management systems.

    The first pillar of the Center for Process Safety (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) is “Commit to Process Safety.”   Supporting this pillar is the element “Process Safety Culture”, which is defined as, “ the combination of group values and behaviors that determine the manner in which process safety is managed.”   One of the four essential features of process safety culture is “strong leadership.”

    Leadership

    What is “leadership”?  It has been described as “organizing or influencing a group to achieve a common goal”.  This would intimate that the leader is a boss or manager, but is a manager necessarily an effective leader?   There is considerable literature about leadership.  This literature includes quotes about leadership, how to find “natural” leaders and how to develop leadership skills.  There are workshops about leadership and even university degrees in leadership.  If there are so many resources dedicated toward understanding and teaching leadership, why is leadership listed as something that needs to be enhanced in symposia, papers and reports that deal with managing process safety in high hazard activities?  It may be because leadership and culture are considered human factors. When associated with process safety, they are known as factors that can lead to loss of the standards of consistently reliable human performance.  These standards are relied on as part of an organization’s defenses against process safety incidents.

    Every person working in the oil, gas, chemical and allied industries should perform their jobs under the guidance of a process safety management system.  CCPS defines a management system as a “formally established and documented set of activities designed to produce specific results in a consistent manner on a sustainable basis.”  Producing specific results in a consistent manner all the time requires that all personnel perform at a high level.  If culture is defined simply as “the way we do things around here”, this is influenced greatly by leadership.  But leadership doesn’t reside in the role of one person.  Leadership needs to be imbedded within the organization with every person.  This is a skill that can be learned by all and dependence on one individual with authority or one person who might be considered a “natural” leader can lead to failure of the system.

    When teams cease to function effectively and breakdowns are discovered in the system to manage process safety, it is highly likely that there is a breakdown in goals, roles and expectations in the team.

    Every person working in or supporting the operation of a high hazard process must be able to recite and explain the goal of every team they work with.  There should never be in any doubt what every team’s goal is.

    Because we may and probably do work on several teams, it is vital that we are clear of our role on each team.  What is my primary function to support achieving the goal? There should never be in any doubt what every person’s role is on that team.

    Does each person on the team have a concisely developed set of expectations for individual and team behavior?  Is there some way for the team to check that the expectations are being met?  What is the procedure for addressing deviation from expectations?

    A PetroSkills client recently asked for a one-day Overview of Risk Based Process Safety Management for Upper Level Management.  Four sessions of this overview have been delivered around the world to the business unit managers and their direct (team members) reports?.  Leadership and working as effective teams are two elements of the session that address the issue of process safety culture in this client’s operations.

    A key learning point offered by participants is that a clear understanding of goals, roles and expectations comes from leadership and exhibiting the appropriate leadership role.  Many leave the session with an action item to conduct team work sessions to establish/reaffirm goals, roles and expectations.

    If you would like a copy of the paper presented at the CCPS 9th Global Congress, contact PetroSkills.

    To develop process safety competency attend our PS-4, Process Safety Engineering;  HS-45, Risk Based Process Safety Management; and PS-2, Fundamental of Process Safety courses.  To develop competency in other skills, attend one of our other courses.

    John M. Campbell Consulting (JMCC) offers consulting expertise on this subject and many others. For more information about the services JMCC provides, visit our website at www.jmcampbellconsulting.com, or email us at consulting@jmcampbell.com.

    By Clyde Young

    PetroSkills Instructor/Consultant

    Reference:

    1.     Clyde Young and John Kanengieter, “Process Safety Management Mentoring:  Developing Leaders”, The (CCPS) 9th Global Conference on Process Safety,  the Center for Chemical Process Safety , April, 2013.

     

  • Debriefing Jobs Provides Several Benefits Associated With Process Safety

    A pillar of Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) is Learn from Experience.  The work we do and the processes we use to analyze our work provide significant learning opportunities to enhance process safety competency.  This is a derivative of Kolb’s experiential learning cycle [1], but many times we fail to take advantage of the learning opportunities available to us unless there is an incident or a near miss.

    This Tip of the Month (TOTM) will introduce a simple method for debriefing the job tasks we perform to close the loop on this cycle and capture appropriate data to develop competency, work safely and capture near miss/incident data quickly and efficiently.

    Conducting a simplified job hazard analysis will ensure that all hazards are identified, managed, and mitigated prior to performing work.  Performing a simple debrief at the conclusion of the work will ensure that we learn from the experience. By considering every job to be performed a learning opportunity, the experiential learning cycle can be used to identify what was done, how well it was done, and how we might improve in the future.

    This Month’s Tip was recently presented at the Mary K. O’Connor Process Safety Symposium at Texas A&M University [1].

    One of the pillars of the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety is “Learn from Experience.”  What does this mean?

    The elements of this pillar include:

    • auditing,
    • management review and continuous improvement,
    • measurement and metrics and
    • incident investigation.

    Each of these elements provides findings, lessons and data that are useful for learning and thus changing and enhancing behaviors and attitudes.  The change and enhancement will influence an organization’s culture and ultimately push the organization toward a learning culture.

    These are not the only opportunities available for organizations to learn from experience.  Metrics and audits can allow a general overview of process safety performance.  Incident investigation insures that when reported, incident information is transmitted to all who will benefit from the learning.

    The job hazard analysis process that many organizations use to identify and mitigate hazards provides a tremendous opportunity to capture data and use the experiential learning cycle if the job is debriefed properly after completion.  This paper will provide guidance and explain the benefits that can be derived from debriefing completed jobs.

    At the 2008 symposium, this author presented a paper entitled “Three Simple Things to Improve Process Safety Management.”  One of those simple things was to conduct a formalized Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) for the tasks being performed in the life cycle of a process.  That paper presented a checklist that could be used to guide personnel in the process of conducting a JHA.  (See checklist at end of this paper)

    Many facilities have embraced the concept of conducting JHA.  They may be called something else  (job safety analysis, job safety checklist, job task analysis) but the process is essentially the same.  The job or task is identified and analyzed step by step.  The analysis is to identify hazards that may be involved with each step and then develop strategies to mitigate the hazards.  This sounds simple in theory, but in reality there are many things that can and do go wrong with this process.

    To provide consistency and to make it easier to track that these analyses have been completed, standardized checklists and forms have been created that list the most common hazards that can be found with a job and logically guide the user toward identification and mitigation of hazards.  Experience shows that after these forms and checklists have been used regularly, some personnel have a tendency to try and short cut the process.  This leads to what is known as “pencil whipping” the JHA.  In other words, personnel will complete the checklist or form without actually performing the analysis required.   Familiarity with the forms and checklists may drive personnel to identify common hazards, but do little to mitigate the hazards.  For example, a common checklist item is “slips, trips and fall hazards”.  Personnel will identify that the ground is rutted or that there is ice on the ground, but few will actually smooth the ground or cover the ice with sand to mitigate the hazards identified.

    It is generally agreed among those who supervise personnel performing JHAs that the most important part of the process is not the completion of the forms and checklists but the discussion that happens among a group performing the work.  In order to focus the discussion and insure that all issues are addressed, the JHA checklist at the end of this paper can be used.  The JHA checklist is not intended to replace the checklists and forms that an organization may already have in place.  The JHA checklist can enhance the process by focusing a group’s thoughts on individual checklist items.  By answering each question a work group should be able to identify all issues associated with any job they are conducting.

    As work groups become more familiar with the JHA checklist and the process of discussing and documenting the efforts of the group, a simplified method can be adopted.  By answering six key questions, a group of workers can focus discussion on the issues that are most important.   The six questions and the benefits of using them include:

    What are we doing?  If we can’t answer this question completely and in simple terms, then we should not be doing the job.  A simple explanation will insure that all members of the team are working toward the same goal.

    What is the most dangerous part?  If we can identify the most dangerous part of what we are doing we have identified all hazards, ranked them and determined the most dangerous part.

    What will we do to protect ourselves?  Answering this question ensures that all mitigation measures have been put into place and that all personnel know what is being done.

    How will we know we are changing what we are doing?  To answer this question effectively, we will need to be creative and analytical.  Examination of the work site, knowledge of simultaneous operations, and competency in our job will be required.  Anticipating potential changes will insure that we are not surprised when things do change.

    What will we do about it?  Again, creativity and analytical thinking are critical here.  Many times we hear the phrase, “prior planning prevents poor performance”.  Effectively answering this question insures that performance will be as designed.

    How will we know we are finished?  Review of completed job hazard analysis documents has shown that it may be difficult to determine at what point the job is complete.  If the permit for the job being performed provides a scope of work like, “replace mechanical seal in hot oil pump”, once the seal is replaced, there are numerous tasks that still need to be performed before the job is complete.  Numerous times the JHA does not go beyond analyzing the tasks associated with the scope of work and do not consider additional tasks; like testing, clean up and turnover to operations.

    As previously mentioned, most supervisors believe that the discussion associated with this type of analysis is more important than the completion of the form used to show that the JHA has been performed.

    What about the form though?

    • What happens at the conclusion of the job?
    • Does anyone review the form to determine if all the hazards were found and mitigated?
    • Does anyone follow up with the work group to see if anything happened that made them change the work?
    • How should this review be performed and what are the benefits that will be gained by this?
    • How can we learn from our experience?

    Developing competent personnel is an ongoing process for most organizations.  A great deal of literature exists on the most effective methods of developing competency in adults. Training sessions are delivered using the concept of Kolb’s theory of the experiential learning cycle.  According to Kolb [2], this type of learning can be defined as “the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience.” [i] In other words, adults learn best when they are actively experiencing something and not just listening to lectures or instructor centered learning.

    Experienced trainers who deliver adult learning sessions use a process of debriefing to allow reflection, reinforce learning and help the learner apply the knowledge to their life.  It is generally acknowledged in the training industry that most real learning takes place in the debrief.  This is the opportunity for learners to reflect and develop knowledge from the activity, in our case the job performed.

    Very simply, debriefing a learning activity should focus on three questions.  What?  So What?  Now What?

    What? is the question that guides the learning toward reflection and what just happened.  This question provides a starting point to discover what everyone involved experienced.

    So What? is the question that leads to drawing conclusions and exploring alternate methods.

    Now What? leads to future planning and continuous improvement initiatives that will be used to strengthen the organization’s culture and work processes.

    If we return to question six of the job hazard analysis process, “How will we know we are done?”, the final answer for this question would be, “When we have completed the debrief of the job performed.”  There are five questions that should be used for debriefing a job.  These five questions, how they relate to the standard debriefing questions and the expected lessons to learn from them include:

    What did we do?  This is the opportunity for reflection and to insure that the job has been completed appropriately.  Each member of the team should come to agreement that what is being described is what was actually done.   This is the What of debriefing.

    Did anything change while doing the job?   Reflection on this question will lead the team to determine if the job was actually performed as it was initially described and analyzed.  This is the question that will also lead to identify incidents for investigation.  If anything unusual occurred during the task, reporting should be more efficient because the incident will be fresh in everyone’s mind.  Capturing these incidents and changes now will help modify future work orders and insure that we learn something from this experience.  This is the So What of the debriefing cycle.

    Did anybody get hurt?  This question should be answered with all personnel examining themselves for strains, pulled muscles, bumps, bruises, cuts, scrapes, twisted joints, twinges in the back and a general self examination for good health.  Any small injury or potential illness should be recorded here.   This will insure that a worker does not leave the job without reporting an injury or illness, and then visit a medical provider later because something cropped up.  Having someone discover they have been injured after leaving the worksite is a problem for managers.  This allows measures to be taken early to manage the injury or illness for reporting purposes.  Here and the next question is where more exploration of the “What” is performed.

    Did anybody come close to getting hurt?  This is the question that will capture near miss incidents quickly.  Near miss reporting programs fail for numerous reasons.  Lack of understanding, lack of motivation, blaming the reporter, and convenience of reporting are reasons that near misses may not be reported.  Reflection and discussion about the completed job will insure that any near miss is reported quickly.  This will lead to creation of a more comprehensive database that can be used to predict trends and identify problems areas in processes.

    What would we do differently?  This is the question that will tie everything together into a plan for the future.  Recommendations and action items should be generated from this final question so that future jobs can be analyzed with more speed and efficiency.  Potential training and competency development issues may be discovered.  Procedures for modification may be identified.  Latent conditions that are not readily apparent may be identified and mitigated before they become active failures.

    The Now What of the debriefing cycle is:

    • Conducting an effective job task analysis and following with an effective debriefing of the job will yield several benefits.
    • Competency gaps of personnel associated with the work will be identified.
    • Training topics and on the job mentoring for personnel with these identified gaps, can be more quickly delivered.
    • Procedural modifications that are necessary to insure that work is performed safely and efficiently will be quickly identified and addressed.
    • Potential process safety incidents will be quickly identified and investigated.
    • Near miss incidents will be reported quickly and the organization’s near miss/incident database will be enhanced.

    The process described in this paper can be expanded to any job and any work group.  Consider an engineering team who is working on the design of a new process to be considered for construction.  Conducting an effective job task analysis in the beginning stages of the project will insure that roles, goals and expectations are addressed and known.  Conducting an effective debrief at the conclusion, or even at selected stages of a project, will enhance the project team’s effectiveness and insure that all team members are always striving to meet the goal of the project.  The attached checklist for engineering projects, at the end of this paper, may be helpful for focusing a team’s efforts.

    Opportunities exist in all phases of operations and in all activities performed to keep processes safe.  It is important that all personnel be aware that learning from experience happens every day and these lessons learned need to be captured and stored for future use.

    To develop process safety competency attend our PS-4, Process Safety Engineering;  HS-45, Risk Based Process Safety Management; and PS-2, Fundamental of Process Safety courses.  To develop competency in other skills, attend one of our other courses.

    By Clyde Young

    PetroSkills Instructor/Consultant

    Reference:

    1.    Young, Clyde. ,” Debrief:  The experiential learning cycle, process safety competency, safe work practices, identifying and reporting of near miss/incident data”, Mary K. O’Connor Process Safety Symposium, Texas A&M University, October 29.

    2.    Kolb, David A. Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1984.

    Job Hazard Analysis Checklist

    1. PROCEDURES

    • ·What are the procedures for the task?
    • ·What is unclear about the procedures?
    • ·What order will we use these procedures?
    • ·What permits are needed for hazard controls?

    2. EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS

    • ·What are the right tools for the job?
    • ·What is the correct way to use them?
    • ·What is the condition of the tool?

    3. POSITIONS OF PEOPLE

    • ·What could we be struck by?
    • ·What could we strike ourselves against?
    • ·What can we get caught in/on/between?
    • ·What are potential trip/fall hazards?
    • ·What are potential hand/finger pinch points?
    • ·What extreme temperatures will we be in/around?
    • ·What are the risks of inhaling, absorbing, swallowing hazardous substances?
    • ·What are the noise levels?
    • ·What electrical current/energized system could we come in contact with?
    • ·What would be a cause for overexerting ourselves?

    4. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

    • ·What is the proper PPE?

    Hard hat, glasses/goggles, ear plugs, gloves, steel toe boots, respiratory system, fire retardant clothing

    5. CHANGING THE COURSE OF WORK

    • ·What would cause us to have to stop or rearrange the job?
    • ·What would cause us to change our tools or equipment?
    • ·What would cause us to have to change our position?
    • ·What would cause us to have to change our PPE?

    YOU HAVE THE RIGHT AND

    THE OBLIGATION TO

    STOP UNSAFE ACTS

    ENGINEERING JOB ANALYSIS

    1. PROCEDURES

    • ·What are the procedures for the task?
    • ·What is unclear about the procedures?
    • ·In what order will we use these procedures?
    • ·What is the proper timeline for these procedures?
    • ·What permits or permissions are needed for job controls?

    2. EQUIPMENT, TOOLS, DOCUMENTS

    • ·What are the right tools for the job? (software, simulators, matrixes, checklists, worksheets…)
    • ·What is the correct way to use them?
    • ·What forms will be needed for the job?
    • ·What documents will we need to produce?
    • ·What else do we need to know?

    3. INTERACTION WITH PEOPLE

    • ·What other departments need to know about this task?
    • ·Who are the personnel that need to know?
    • ·What other departments will supply information for this task?
    • ·Who are the personnel who will supply that information?
    • ·What could prevent other personnel or departments from supplying what we need?
    • ·What could prevent us from supplying what other departments need?

    4.  CHANGING THE COURSE OF WORK

    • ·What would cause us to have to stop or rearrange the job?
    • ·What would cause us to change our tools or equipment?
    • ·What would cause us to have to change our interaction with people?

    YOU HAVE THE RIGHT AND THE OBLIGATION TO

    STOP UNSAFE or UNPRODUCTIVE ACTS

  • What is Mentoring?

    What is Mentoring?

    In this Tip of the Month, we explore how process safety competency can be enhanced through mentoring programs.

    This TOTM is the paper that was developed by JMC Instructor/Consultants Clyde Young and Keith Hodges presentation at the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) 8th Global Conference on Process Safety in April, 2012.  The paper will also be published in the AIChE (American Institute of Chemical Engineering) publication, “Process Safety Progress.”

    Commit to Process Safety is the first pillar mentioned in “Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety Management”, published by CCPS.  This pillar is supported by five elements.  One of the elements is Process Safety Competency, which is associated with efforts to maintain, improve and broaden knowledge and expertise.

    In Greek mythology, Odysseus, King of Ithaca went to fight in the Trojan Wars. Before he left, he entrusted his son Telemachus to the care of his old and trusted friend MENTOR. It was some ten years before father and son were reunited and during this time the development and care of his son was with Mentor.

    What is often missing from historical accounts is that it is Athene, the Goddess of Wisdom, who appears to Telemachus in the likeness of Mentor and gives advice, encouragement and spiritual insight.

    Since then, the word Mentor has become synonymous with trusted advisor, friend and teacher, a wise person.

    Demographic studies of the oil and gas processing industry indicate that a large number of people are retiring and being replaced by younger, less experienced personnel.  This presents a challenge to the industry.  A wise mountaineer once stated, “Good judgment comes from bad experiences.” With the influx of less experienced personnel, it would be shameful to have their good judgment developed from their bad experiences.  Especially since these bad experiences can be catastrophic.

    Organizations in the industry have spent considerable resources recruiting the best talent available and most have a competency development program that these new workers enter.  The program will generally include a step to have a more experienced person provide feedback on the worker to assess competency in the job. Well-developed and resourced competency development programs will have a Mentor assigned to the worker.

    What does this really mean and how can an organization insure that process safety competency is developed in all personnel, even if process safety activities are not the primary role?

    This TOTM will provide some guidance and best practices for establishing Mentoring programs with an emphasis on developing process safety competency in the younger, less experienced workforce.

    The role of Mentor involves teaching, helping, protecting, challenging, motivating, guiding, coaching, listening, and providing career guidance; it falls short of counseling.  Counseling is the provision of professional psychological help and advice and chosen Mentors would be foolhardy to attempt such a role without extensive training.

    Mentoring is usually a formal or informal relationship between two people, a Mentor (usually and preferably outside the Mentee’s area of supervision) and a Mentee.  The Mentor can also be provided from an external organization. This can be preferable especially if there is any hint of competition between the Mentors and Mentees (e.g. working in the same department as peers).  There are different rules of engagement if the external option is taken and this is outside the scope of this paper.  Peer Mentoring can be a useful option, especially if a peer Mentor has specific skills and qualifications.

    Using a Mentee’s supervisor within a discipline should be avoided as there could be a conflict of interest.  The Mentor may be Mentoring one day and disciplining the next, This is not conducive to building trust, which is an important ingredient in the Mentoring process.

    Mentoring should not be substituted for conventional classroom or computer-moderated training. It enhances traditional training by allowing the Mentee to learn from experienced colleagues within the working environment.

    Choosing a Mentor

    The choice of Mentors is an important aspect of a program and managers should first be satisfied that a Mentor not only has the required technical skills, but also has the ability to convey those to others in an efficient and effective way. Competency associated with Mentoring skills does not necessarily come naturally to everyone with highly competent technical skills.  A key skill to insure effective process safety is communication with all disciplines that could have an impact on the process.

    Mentor Program

    It is foolhardy to think that just putting together a pool of people as Mentors and pairing them with Mentees is going to be an effective way to put a Mentor program together.  It takes planning and needs structure.  There has to be an organizational aim for the program with measurable objectives.  The Mentor should be provided with these and a list of roles and responsibilities, which they should fully comprehend.

    There should be a selection process for Mentors and organizations must recognize that a training program may have to be created for selected Mentors.

    Ideally the Mentee should be able to select the Mentor from a pool of people in the organization; management, the training department or HR should not pair them.  Mentors should have the option to refuse the role should they feel that it would not be appropriate.

    Mentoring and Process Safety

    A Mentoring program is not to be approached in a haphazard fashion if the goal is to develop competent personnel.  A Mentoring program is much like a process safety management system.  The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety Management (RBPSM) defines a management system as, “A formally established and documented set of activities designed to produce specific results in a consistent manner on a sustainable basis.”  The Mentoring program should be formalized, documented and designed to produce specific results.  The specific results are competent personnel associated with process safety.

    Mentees within a program may have been chosen because they are targeted to fill a key role within the organization.  This role could be a technical position that requires narrow skills in a field or a supervisory position of either engineering personnel or operations personnel.  The competency levels associated with process safety that are required will be highly dependent on the role in the organization.  The Mentor/Mentee relationship should keep this in mind as the process progresses.

    An effective Mentoring program that includes process safety as a key component will yield numerous benefits to the organization.  A Mentor with wide professional and technical expertise should have considerable experience in areas that involve process safety.  A Mentor that truly understands the concepts of risk based process safety will be invaluable to a Mentee with less experience.  Consider the pillars of RBPSM and some of the elements within each pillar.

    Commit to Process Safety

    Elements of this pillar include:

    • Process safety culture
    • Compliance with standards
    • Process safety competency
    • Workforce involvement
    • Stakeholder outreach

    A simple definition of culture is, “How we do things around here.”  Organizations strive to develop a learning culture that seeks hazards and solutions on a continuous basis.  It is imperative that Mentees are provided awareness level training on the organization’s culture and the Mentor will be given training on how to act as the example.  Two significant benefits will come from this.  The Mentors will examine their own actions within the culture and insure that they are setting a good example.  The Mentee will question why and how activities are accomplished and learn his/her role within the organization’s culture, which should accelerate the Mentees contribution through self-awareness.

    It will be difficult for a less experienced worker to learn the things required to insure compliance with all applicable standards.  An effective Mentor should always guide the Mentee toward the correct answer associated with compliance but not necessarily answer the question of compliance.  The guidance and allowing the Mentee to find the answer will insure that the learning associated with compliance will be retained long after the answer is discovered.

    Process safety competency of the Mentee will be enhanced significantly, but only if the Mentor insures that the Mentee is directed to the appropriate resources for this.  The Mentor does not necessarily have to be considered a process safety expert.  The Mentor does have to be aware that some process safety issues require a level of expertise that will be found elsewhere.  And sometimes those resources may be outside the organization.

    For a process safety management system to thrive, staff members at all levels of the organization must take an active role.  The role taken needs to be identified and metrics established to show participation in the role.  A Mentor can provide guidance and suggestions so that the Mentee is consistently working toward the goals of the process safety management system. Appropriately timed reviews of progress associated with established process safety metrics should be scheduled and conducted.

    Stakeholders include outside contractors, shareholders, community members and partners in joint ventures.  A Mentee may be involved with negotiations and planning activities associated with all kinds of stakeholders.  A Mentor’s experience in the industry and the organization can be very useful to insure that all stakeholder interests are addressed.

    Understand Hazards and Risks

    Elements of this pillar include:

    • Process knowledge management
    • Hazard identification and risk analysis

    Development of a Mentee’s competency in this pillar of RBPSM could be the Mentor’s most important role. Insuring that the correct process knowledge is developed and managed appropriately is a critical activity that the Mentee strives for. There is no need for a Mentee to learn from mistakes if a Mentor can provide clear guidance on this pillar.

    It is within these two elements that mistakes can lead to catastrophic events.  Having an incorrectly sized relief valve installed in a process or not anticipating the consequences of failure of controls is not acceptable. The Mentor and Mentee should routinely conduct discussions about these elements.

    Contract services are utilized a great deal for design of new and modified facilities.  A Mentor who has significant experience in this area can provide the Mentee advice and guidance for overseeing these projects.  Oversight by a qualified company representative will insure that all issues associated with a project have been addressed.

    Providing resources during the conduct of Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) studies is a challenge for many organizations. This is especially true considering the demographics of the industry at this time. More experienced personnel have moved on. PHA team members with significant experience are critical to the success of a PHA.  A Mentee who is assigned to a PHA team may or may not work side by side with their Mentor.  If the assigned Mentor is also a member of the PHA team, this may prove advantageous.  As the role of Mentor is to provide guidance and direction to new and developing staff, the PHA is an excellent environment to do just that.  The structure of the PHA provides an opportunity to guide the Mentee in the proper way to identify hazards, develop measures to mitigate those hazards and work as a team member in a formalized setting.

    Manage Risk

    Within this pillar, a Mentee will benefit from the guidance of an experienced Mentor to become proficient at what might be considered the day-to-day activities associated with their job.  Elements are:

    • Procedures
    • Safe work practices
    • Asset integrity
    • Contractors
    • Training and performance
    • Management of change
    • Operational readiness
    • Conduct of operations
    • Emergency management

    Sometimes organizations will assign a younger, less experienced person to a supervisory position in operations to “season” them. Studies have shown that a great number of incidents occur during normal operations.  Having a Mentor with significant operations experience will accelerate the “seasoning” process and insure that the problems associated with day-to-day activities do not lead to a catastrophic incident.

    Working in operations supervision will certainly expose the Mentee to many issues associated with personal interaction. Dealing with people may be one of the most difficult tasks undertaken. Having the ear of a Mentor can be helpful as the Mentee develops his/her skills in this area.

    Learn From Experience

    There is no reason that a young professional cannot learn from the experience of others. To pass along the experience and knowledge that has been gained over the years is the focus of a Mentoring program.   Hopefully, the Mentee will not have to experience a catastrophic incident to learn from experience.

    Elements within this pillar are:

    • Incident investigation
    • Measurement
    • Audits
    • Management review and continuous improvement

    Having a Mentor available to help review near miss reports, incident investigations, audit findings and metrics associated with process safety can provide the Mentee with a “cold eye” review of issues that are the Mentee’s responsibility to address.  Often a wiser, more experienced Mentor will have experienced some of the same things that are being discovered under the Mentee’s watch.  In this case, issues should be able to be addressed quickly and more efficiently.

    Troubleshooting

    All processes within the industries we work have been designed to operate in a specified manner. This manner includes specific temperatures, pressures, flow rates and levels.  Defining these specific parameters establishes “normal” for these processes.  Operating processes in a “normal” manner reduces the likelihood of a catastrophic incident.  Deviation from “normal” is not acceptable and identifying this deviation and taking the steps required to return to normal requires experience and knowledge. This is known as troubleshooting. Process safety management is a system that establishes “normal” and provides directions on maintaining “normal”. Personnel with effective troubleshooting skills will also work efficiently within an organization’s process safety management system.

    A formalized, well established Mentoring program for younger, less experienced personnel entering the business enhances everyone’s troubleshooting skills.  The Mentee has someone (the Mentor) available to query about issues seen and the Mentor is challenged to insure the advice and guidance provided is correct and useful.

    Attaining high-level competency in a job requires training and then performing the job for a period of time.  Accelerating the path to high-level competency is a significant goal of a formalized Mentoring program.

    Conclusion

    At the beginning of this TOTM, it was stated that the word Mentor has become synonymous with trusted advisor, friend and teacher, a wise person. Process safety management has become synonymous for reducing the risk associated with the activities performed in our industries.

    Risk is often viewed differently from individual to individual.  A person’s perception of risk may change with familiarity.  Having a trusted advisor for younger, less experienced personnel, to help identify and provide suggestions for mitigation of hazards, in all their forms, is a strong competency development tool for any organization.  Personnel will be developed quicker and more efficiently. Experienced personnel are one of a company’s most valuable resources.  Acting as a Mentor can be the best use of this resource and will provide a challenge that some people thrive on.

    Any organization that truly strives for a generative safety culture should do whatever it takes to implement a process safety-Mentoring program. The benefits will be seen and reaped for years to come.

    To learn more about managing process safety systems, we suggest attending our PetroSkills HSE course,  HS 45- Risk Based Process Safety Management.

    To enhance process safety engineering skills we suggest any of the JMC foundation courses or our, PS 4 – Process Safety Engineering course.

    John M. Campbell Consulting (JMCC) offers consulting expertise on this subject and many others. For more information about the services JMCC provides, visit our website at www.jmcampbellconsulting.com, or email us at consulting@jmcampbell.com.

    By: Clyde Young and Keith Hodges

     

  • Analyzing Engineering Tasks to Minimize or Eliminate Mistakes

    In the April, 2011, Tip of the Month (TOTM), we looked at a simple, graphical representation of process safety competency.  This TOTM will follow up on that by asking a simple question:

    “When examining catastrophic incidents, what are the typical mistakes that engineers make?”

    This question was asked of me at a lunch and learn session I conducted for a client where I had described the competency pyramid introduced in the April TOTM.  At the time, I thought, what a good question.  I replied, I have to think about that.  After reflecting for a bit, I went to the pyramid.

    Figure 1

    Looking at the pyramid, it seems to me that a lot of an engineer’s duties revolve around the “Equipment” and “Mitigation” levels.  It is here that separators are sized; pumps are chosen; inherently safer design is incorporated into a process; safety instrumented systems (SIS) are designed; pressure safety valve (PSV) sizing is calculated.  Refer to the April TOTM again.  “To become a well rounded professional in the oil and gas industry, no matter what specialty position a person works in, requires varying degrees of competency in many different areas of expertise.  Obtaining higher level competencies is a continuous process of training and performing tasks, sometimes under the direction of a mentor or coach.”

    It could be that the typical mistakes made by engineers are a result of competency with equipment and mitigation measures.  Consider some information from JMC’s Process Safety Engineering course, PS 4.  This table lists the area of responsibility for incidents [1].

    Table 1

    Notes:

    1. The item “inspection during operation” includes some items that are not always the responsibility of the inspection department:
      1. Vibration monitoring for rotating equipment.
      2. Corrosion probes
    2. The item “inspection of process fluids” includes:
      1. Flammable-gas detection in shutdown, and in tanks during operation
      2. Inspection of purchased and process fluids to determine whether they are the ones specified.
    3. The average incident has 1.56 responsibilities

    How many of the items on the list are engineering functions and which of them could be related to competency?  I suppose it could be argued that almost all are related to engineering functions if it is accepted that engineers provide the design, recommend inspections and maintenance tasks, provide significant information needed for development of operating procedures and have historically been assigned management responsibilities in the oil and gas industry.  Which are related to competency?  That is much more difficult to answer and could only be answered by individual organizations based on performance reviews and competency mapping.

    The April, 2010, TOTM discussed the need to perform a good job task analysis to identify personal and process safety hazards.  While the checklist presented there can be modified to allow engineering personnel to analyze engineering tasks, there is a simpler way to insure that engineers reduce the likelihood of mistakes in their work.  Ask the following six questions about any project or job that is being done.  If each question is answered fully, the job should be performed mistake free.

    • What are we doing? — A very simple description of what is required to perform the task.
    • What is the most dangerous part? — To find the most dangerous part, all hazards will have to be identified.
    • What will we do to protect ourselves? — Plan for the worst.
    • How will we know that we are changing what we are doing?—Insures that scope creep doesn’t happen.
    • What will we do about it? — Contingency planning prior to problems being encountered.
    • How will we know we are done? — Should be able to identify everything that needs to be in place when finished.

    It is difficult to determine the typical mistakes, related to technical competency, made by engineers that cause or could reasonably cause a catastrophic incident.  Root cause analysis can usually discover breakdowns in an organization’s process safety management system.  Using the six questions to analyze work prior to starting and periodically throughout the life of a project may help to keep personnel focused on the consequences of failure and reduce the likelihood of failure.  Thus, reducing risk.

    Several JMC courses develop competencies associated with the equipment and mitigation levels of the competency pyramid.  To learn more about process safety for engineers, consider attending a  session of our PS 4, Process Safety Engineering course.

    John M. Campbell Consulting (JMCC) offers consulting expertise on this subject and many others. For more information about the services JMCC provides, visit our website at www.jmcampbellconsulting.com, or email your consulting needs to consulting@jmcampbell.com.

     

    By:  Clyde Young

     

    Reference:

    1. Ian Duguid, “Take This Safety Database to Heart”, Chemical Engineering Magazine, July 2001.

     

  • A Simplified, Graphical Representation of Process Safety Competency Development

    In this Tip of the Month, we explore how process safety competency can be identified and developed using a simple model for guidance.

    This TOTM is the paper that was developed by JMC Instructor/Consultant Clyde Young for a poster presentation at the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) 7th Global Congress on Process Safety in March, 2011.

    Commit to Process Safety is the first pillar mentioned in “Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety Management”, published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS).  This pillar is supported by five elements.  One of the elements is Process Safety Competency, which is described as being associated with efforts to maintain, improve and broaden knowledge and expertise.

    Competency defined

    Competency is a word that is used a great deal by human resources departments, training departments and even government agencies.   Many organizations have expended tremendous amounts of resources identifying and documenting competency levels.  The documentation is sometimes referred to as competency maps that describe the skills required for specific levels of expertise or competency.  In general, these skill levels include awareness, fundamental application, skilled application and mastery competencies.   Training programs and courses usually deliver competencies at the awareness and fundamental application level, but it takes work experience and time in position to acquire the higher level competencies.  Achieving the mastery level competencies of a skill may take years of work and academic achievement.

    To become a well rounded professional in the oil and gas industry, no matter what specialty position a person works in, requires varying degrees of competency in many different areas of expertise.  Obtaining higher level competencies is a continuous process of training and performing tasks, sometimes under the direction of a mentor or coach.

    Workforce challenges

    The workforce in the oil and gas industry is getting older and younger.  Demographics indicate that a large number of workers may be retiring soon and a large number of younger workers will be hired to replace them.  There is and will continue to be, for a considerable time, a large gap in knowledge that can only be partially filled through training.

    Newer, less experienced workers can be trained to a certain level of competency.  Working on assigned tasks under the direction of a mentor is supposed to help them achieve the higher level competencies, which make them more productive and valuable to the organization.  With the age gap that exists in our business, these more experienced people are increasingly being asked to perform the technical work that the less experienced people are not competent to do.  This means they have less time to mentor or coach and younger employees are sometimes left to build their higher level competencies independently.  For some applications, this may not be a big problem.  This can lead to a higher level of risk in the workplace especially when it comes to process safety.

    Development of personnel within the process safety profession requires skills and levels that are not easily obtained.  People working in other areas of expertise, sometimes called disciplines, will certainly require process safety competencies at appropriate levels to be able to identify and manage the risk associated with the processes we operate in our business.

    Being able to describe how and why a person achieves necessary competencies can be difficult.  Choosing applicable competencies from maps or tools is sometimes confusing.  Understanding the relationship among all the skills required is vital to developing personnel in the process safety function.  Perhaps a simple, graphic will help.

    Competency pyramid

    Cometency Pyramid

    The pyramid above illustrates a progression for process safety competency.  Throughout the progression, a person may decide to specialize in certain areas.  That does not mean the other skills should be ignored, only that they need to be developed to the appropriate level.   Specialists will require skilled application and in some cases mastery level competency to be proficient.  Everyone in an organization requires at least an awareness level or higher competency in all elements of the pyramid so that when faced with an abnormal situation, the proper action is taken.

    Building a base

    Consider someone recently hired by a company.  The new hire must receive training and apply the training to all of the company policies and procedures that exist to work for that company.  It’s critical for a person to know things like:  when to come to work, who their supervisor is, how to fill out a time card correctly, how to file an insurance claim, how they fit into the organization’s risk management system, how to work in teams, how much risk the company is willing to accept, and ultimately how to exhibit leadership skills.  New hires who struggle with the day to day procedures of working for an organization will not provide value and may eventually leave.  (See Company Policy level of pyramid)

    The training and guidance required for a new hire to become proficient at all the things included in the base of the pyramid can be delivered in several ways.  Formalized orientation training and mentored guidance are some of the most effective methods, but generally a person achieves proficiency here by working for a period of time and gathering knowledge as it is presented.

    Define normal

    Oil and gas are hydrocarbons.  In order to perform technical work in this industry, people will require a certain level of competency about the physical properties of hydrocarbons.   This includes how they act at different temperatures, pressures and flow rates.  Hydrocarbon products will burn and release energy at different pressures and temperatures.  There is a certain amount of risk associated with hydrocarbons and managing this risk requires that all personnel obtain a competency level associated with hydrocarbons that is commensurate with the job. (See Properties of Hydrocarbons level of pyramid)

    Working with hydrocarbons requires equipment.  Equipment includes piping systems and their components, pumps, compressors, turbines, columns, heat exchangers, control loops and hundreds of other things.  Personnel need to understand that to reduce the risk associated with working with hydrocarbons, equipment suitable for the application must be chosen.  There is also a certain amount of risk associated with the different types of equipment involved.  The risks associated with centrifugal pumps are different than the risks associated with positive displacement pumps.  Now consider the types of jobs associated with equipment and the competency levels required to perform those jobs.  Engineers might need to have a skilled application competency level to choose the equipment suitable for the application, a fundamental application competency level may be sufficient for operations personnel and a person performing maintenance may require a mastery level competency, depending on the complexity of the equipment and the job to be performed.  (See Equipment level of pyramid)

    All processes within the oil and gas industry consist of equipment, designed to contain, move and process the raw materials.  The composition of the raw materials and the desired output determines the type of process used.  This could include dehydration to remove water, separation and stabilization, or fractionation to separate the components of natural gas liquids.  In addition to the main processes, several utility functions will exist in a facility to provide air, fuel and electricity according to the specifications required.    (See Processes level of Pyramid)

    One of the key basic principles of oil and gas is that they consist of many components and can be processed into products that can be sold.  This is done by controlling flow, temperature, and pressure within the chosen equipment that makes up the processes.  To do this safely and efficiently normal operating parameters must be established and operating procedures must be implemented.  To ensure normal operations, equipment must be installed and maintained according to best practices in the industry.  Because there are inherent hazards associated with hydrocarbons it is crucial that the products be contained within the equipment of the process.

    All processes that handle hydrocarbons are designed a certain way.  Specific equipment installed to make up a process, with specific parameters for flow, pressure, and temperature.  Process safety begins with defining what normal should be.  The operations and maintenance level of the pyramid defines how an organization keeps a process within normal.  (See Operations and Maintenance level of pyramid)

    What could go wrong?

    Consider the definition of risk as defined in “Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety Management”, published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS).  Risk is a combination of three things.  What can go wrong?  How bad could it be?  How often could it happen?

    Up to this point in the competency pyramid, a good base is being built for anyone working in the oil and gas industry.  Just as a firm foundation is required to build a pyramid, a good foundation is required to prepare anyone working in the process safety field to identify and mitigate hazards.  Organizations expect personnel to be able to identify a hazard and then develop a strategy to reduce the risk associated with that hazard, but many times personnel do not have the basic competencies required to even see a hazard, let alone reduce the risk.  This is the reasoning behind the competency pyramid and the concept that certain competency levels must be attained before risk can be addressed.

    There are two types of hazards to be identified under the concept of, “What could go wrong?” These are process hazards and personal hazards.  While it is generally agreed that personal injury rates do not necessarily correlate to process safety, there are issues associated with personal safety that do carry over to process safety.  The most critical is identification of personal hazards while performing routine work.  Experience has shown that personnel have a tendency to focus on personal hazards when performing a job hazard analysis and fail to identify potential process hazards that could lead to an injury.  This is the reason why the foundation of the competency pyramid is important for all personnel.

    Identifying process hazards is usually performed by following an established methodology, like hazard and operability study (HAZOP), bow tie analysis, or what if/checklist.  But each of these methodologies requires that a competent team of people perform the analysis.  It is unlikely that hazards associated with a process can be identified (What can go wrong?) if the team does not possess higher level competencies associated with the base of the pyramid.  (See Hazards level of pyramid)

    How bad could it be?

    The next question in identifying risk is, “How bad could it be?”  The next level of the competency pyramid, analysis, is associated with this.  It is fairly simple to calculate this once it has been determined what could go wrong.  There are formulas available to perform calculations on how big the fire will be, the distance associated with explosions and what a toxic cloud might look like.  In some cases, these are specialty skills and require much higher levels of competency.  It may be enough for most process safety professionals to know that these types of tools and skills are available and some knowledge of how they work.  Personnel in all disciplines should at least be aware that analysis has been performed and what the results are.  These analyses tie directly to the emergency response layer for planning purposes. (See Analysis level of pyramid)

    Redefine normal

    It is never appropriate to identify a hazard without doing something to eliminate or mitigate it.  The next level of the pyramid addresses competencies on choosing, sizing and installing appropriate levels of protection to eliminate the hazard or reduce the consequences of a hazard.  A process safety professional can choose from a selection of appropriate safeguards with the philosophy of hierarchy of controls in mind.  Each of the controls in the hierarchy, engineering controls first, administrative controls next and finally personal protective equipment, will require specific levels of competency to insure that the appropriate controls are chosen.  Examples include pressure safety valves (PSVs), emergency shutdown (ESD) systems, blast walls, fire walls, scrubber systems for toxic materials, and even something as simple as spacing of equipment.  (See Mitigation level of pyramid)

    The next level of the pyramid addresses competencies that are required to plan for emergency situations.  It is difficult to plan for an emergency if it is not understood what could go wrong and how bad it could be.  This is why all the other levels of the pyramid must be addressed prior to emergency planning.     (See Emergency Response level of pyramid)

    How often could it happen?

    The incident investigation competency level helps address the third question when defining risk, “How often could it happen?”  By investigating incidents and near misses according to established procedures, data is collected that can be used to identify trends and deviations from normal.  If these trends and deviations are consistently identified  and addressed, risk is reduced.  If it is discovered that competency gaps contribute to incidents, skills in the lower regions of the pyramid can be developed to reduce the likelihood of a catastrophic incident.   (See Incident Investigation level of pyramid)

    Day to day activities

    Near the top of the competency pyramid, a process safety professional should now have the skills required to manage all of the activities associated with process safety in the organization.  Management of change is an example element of the overall management system that exhibits the inter relationship among all the elements and how important it is for personnel to have appropriate levels of competency in all aspects of process safety.  (See Process Safety Mgmt. level of pyramid)

    If process safety is defining and keeping the process within normal parameters, all personnel within the organization should have appropriate levels of competency to work within the system that has been developed.  Contractors will be chosen, modified processes will be started and management will be monitoring the system to insure that risk has been reduced to as low as reasonably practicable.

    Many organizations have begun addressing the competency gap that is created as the workforce ages and less experienced people are hired.  The boom and bust cycles of the oil and gas industry have been seen for years.  Within most facilities, there are usually a few key individuals.  These are usually older, more experienced people.  They are the ones who have the ability to see a problem, identify the cause and then do something to fix the problem.  This is the competency level that everyone in the organization should strive for.  However, this takes time and experience.  Management has a responsibility to see that appropriate resources are available to make this happen.

    Capstone

    The capstone of the pyramid represents a troubleshooter. This position requires a significant number of skills, at varying levels of competency to be able to design an effective process safety management system, to identify deficiencies in a system when auditing and make appropriate recommendations to address the deficiencies.   An effective process safety management system should be balanced according to the resources that are available.  A process safety troubleshooter will have the skills and experience to not only identify deviations from normal system requirements, the troubleshooter will also be able to determine the most effective way to bring the system back to normal. (See TRB level of pyramid)

    Sometimes it is difficult for personnel to identify competency gaps and suggest plans for developing the skills required to fill those gaps.  This simplified, graphical pyramid of process safety competency has proven to be a key learning point when conducting training about risk based process safety.  Participants have commented that break downs in an organization’s process safety management system can be identified and addressed by using the pyramid to identify competency gaps and developing strategies to address those gaps.

    “The main product of the competency element is an understanding and interpretation of knowledge that helps the organization make better decisions and increases the likelihood that individuals who are faced with an abnormal situation will take the proper action.”  This statement from the CCPS book, “Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety”, describes anyone working in the oil and gas industry.  For those considered to be process safety professionals, taking the proper action to address an abnormal situation can insure that the risk associated within the industry is reduced to an acceptable level.

    The pyramid isn’t just for process safety professionals.  All personnel within an organization will be able to use to the pyramid to obtain at the very least, a snapshot of where improvement is needed.  Senior managers, line managers, operator and maintenance personnel alike should study the pyramid to identify areas of improvement and create development plans for themselves and their direct reports.

    If you would like a copy of the paper that was presented, please contact John M. Campbell & Co. and request a copy.

    To learn more about managing process safety systems, we suggest attending our PetroSkills HSE course,  HS 45- Risk Based Process Safety Management or schedule a session of our two day Process Safety Case Study for Operations and Maintenance – OT 21,   To enhance process safety engineering skills we suggest any of the JMC foundation courses or our, PS 4 – Process Safety Engineering course.
    By: Clyde Young

  • Three Simple Things to Improve Process Safety Management

    In this Tip of the Month, we look at how to deal with some of the challenges of managing process safety.  This TOTM is an excerpt of a paper presented by JMC Instructor/Consultant, Clyde Young at the 2008 Mary K. O’Connor Process Safety Symposium.  This TOTM continues where the February 2009, TOTM left off.

    When there are newspaper accounts of process incidents that have occurred, there is usually a statement along the lines of, “It just happened with no warning.”  There are warning signs for every incident. Latent failures exist in all processes and eventually lead to active failures when circumstances align.   Personnel must be taught how to see and react to these warning signs.

    Throughout the lifecycle of a process, many tasks are performed.  Even when a process is running in “normal” mode, operators perform routine tasks and maintenance to keep the process at “normal”.  Now and then, the process is shut down for maintenance and then started again.  Every time a task is performed there is the possibility that a latent condition may expose itself and lead to an active failure.  Many organizations have implemented a requirement that all job tasks be analyzed through a process known as Job Task Analysis (JTA), Job Safety Analysis (JSA), or Job Hazard Analysis (JHA).  There are many titles and acronyms for this process, but all have one common theme.  Analyze the task to be performed, identify hazards and mitigate those hazards.  Sadly, these analyses become routine and the documentation associated with them becomes nothing more than a checklist that needs to be filled out and turned in.   This is sometimes known as “pencil whipping” the form.

    Performing a job hazard analysis is not difficult, but does need to be a formalized process that controls or eliminates the hazards identified.  This is the third simple thing we can do to improve our process safety management systems.

     

    Review the checklist below:

    • PROCEDURES
    • What are the procedures for the task?
    • What is unclear about the procedures?
    • What order will we use these procedures?
    • What permits are needed for hazard controls?
    • EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS
    • What are the right tools for the job?
    • What is the correct way to use them?
    • What is the condition of each tool?
    • POSITIONS OF PEOPLE
    • What could we be struck by?
    • What could we strike ourselves against?
    • What can we get caught in/on/between?
    • What are potential trip/fall hazards?
    • What are potential hand/finger pinch points?
    • What extreme temperatures will we be in/around?
    • What are the risks of inhaling, absorbing, swallowing hazardous substances?
    • What are the noise levels?
    • What electrical current/energized system could we come in contact with?
    • What would be a cause for overexerting ourselves?
    • PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
    • What is the proper PPE?

    Hard hat, glasses/goggles, ear plugs, gloves, steel toe boots, respiratory system, fire retardant clothing

    • CHANGING THE COURSE OF WORK
    • What would cause us to have to stop or rearrange the job?
    • What would cause us to change our tools or equipment?
    • What would cause us to have to change our position?
    • What would cause us to have to change our PPE?

    YOU HAVE THE RIGHT AND
    THE OBLIGATION TO

    STOP UNSAFE ACTS

     

    The above checklist is being used by a major oil and gas production company and has become a key element of how they do things.  In other words, it is part of their culture.  Contractors working for this company have begun using the checklist to analyze the tasks they perform.

    The procedure for using the checklist is simple.  All personnel assigned to perform a task will gather for a meeting.  Each person has a copy of this checklist and one person will be assigned to document the findings of the meeting.  A leader is assigned and the leader begins asking the questions, in the order written.  The group answers each question and all the answers are documented.  This is vital because if the process is not documented, it did not happen.  Each group member follows along with the checklist and it is their responsibility to insure that the leader does not skip a question or that any member does not fail to answer a question.

    Consider the first question, “What are the procedures for the task?”  Answering this question will require that the appropriate procedures are gathered.  The second question, “What is unclear about the procedures?” will insure that all personnel have reviewed the procedures.  If there is no written procedure, then one must be created.

    As the checklist is reviewed and each question answered and documented, a thorough review of the job will be conducted and any hazards or issues identified will be mitigated or addressed.  In the end, all personnel will become more competent at identifying and mitigating hazards.  Latent failures may be exposed and the job can proceed safely.

    Some may say, “Wait a minute here.  Conducting JHAs is usually considered a personnel safety issue and we know that having a good personnel safety record does not indicate effective process safety.”  This is true, but one of the elements of risk based process safety is safe work practices.  On many occasions, process incidents begin with routine job tasks that are not performed correctly.  Using the JHA checklist according to a formalized procedure yields several benefits.  Personnel performing the jobs have the necessary procedures for performing the task. The procedures are reviewed to insure accuracy. Procedures are identified for development. Training issues are identified for personnel who do not understand the procedures or task. Hazards that are not readily apparent are identified and mitigated before the job. Latent failures are identified and addressed. Deviations from “normal” can be predicted and addressed early in a project or task.  Even if an organization has implemented a global JHA process, local management can use this JHA checklist to enhance the organization’s process.

    Performing a JHA with this checklist may be a bit time consuming at first.  As personnel become more familiar with and practice the process, the time required will be reduced.  The analysis of each job will take as long as necessary to do a thorough review.  Even though production pressures are always part of every job, whatever time is required to do an effective analysis will be worth it.

    The three simple things presented in this paper are meant to be implemented at the process/plant level, not at the global level of an organization.  Implementing them at the process and plant level is much like a pilot project and the process of implementation can be more easily fine tuned.   Effective process safety management system implementation and maintenance can be difficult and time consuming.  These simple things can be modified as personnel become more competent and thus make management of process safety more efficient and effective.

    The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) book, “Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety”, concludes with the following [1]:

    “Standing still, congratulating ourselves on the successes of the past 20 years, and celebrating accidents that did not occur because of all of our hard work, will not prevent the next accident.  Improvement will always be necessary. We must choose between moving forward, standing still, or slipping backward.  We need not debate which direction to choose, only embrace the opportunity for each company to make a risk informed decision regarding which forward path leads more directly to the ultimate goal of a safe, effective, and economically competitive operation.”

    Too often it is heard that the reason something is done a certain way is because it’s always been done that way.  That does not mean the way things are done is correct or efficient.  These three simple things may seem onerous at first, but they do not have to be permanent changes.  They only need to be implemented long enough to insure personnel are competent and efficient at process safety.  This is especially important when it is considered that over the next 10 years it is estimated that the oil and gas industry will be required to replace everyone who was hired in the early 1980’s.

    The next generation of workers in our industry needs to be given every opportunity to become competent at process safety.

    If you would like a copy of the paper that was presented, please contact John M. Campbell & Co. and request a copy.

    To learn more about managing process safety systems, we suggest attending our PetroSkills HSE course, HS 45- Risk Based Process Safety Management or schedule a session of our two day Process Safety Case Study for Operations and Maintenance – OT 21, which can be found in our catalog.  To enhance process safety engineering skills we suggest any of the JMC foundation courses or  of our newly developed,  PS 4 – Process Safety Engineering course.

    By: Clyde Young
    Instructor/Consultant

    Reference:

  • Three Simple Things to Improve Process Safety Management

    In this Tip of the Month, we look at how to deal with some of the challenges of managing process safety.  This TOTM is an excerpt of a paper presented by JMC Instructor/Consultant, Clyde Young at the 2008 Mary K. O’Connor Process Safety Symposium.  This TOTM continues where the February 2009, TOTM left off.

    Processes are designed to run in a “normal” mode.  No process is really stagnant and throughout the life cycle of a process, changes will be made.  When defining “normal”, some tolerance should be built in to allow a range of operating conditions for operators to work within.  When changes to operating parameters, or the equipment in the process are required, these must be evaluated and approved. Any effective process safety management system will contain an element to deal with Management of Change (MOC).  Experience conducting training, audits and process hazard analysis studies indicate that identifying what changes require evaluation using the MOC process can be confusing at times.  Some organizations only evaluate technical changes to the process and equipment and ignore or forget about managing changes to the PSM system or personnel changes within the organization.

    Insuring that PHAs are consistent with the process through the revalidation process is less time consuming and more likely to yield effective results if the facility’s MOC program is rigorously followed.  If this cannot be assured, then the only choice may be a complete redo of the PHAs.  This could be very expensive and resource intensive.

    To alleviate confusion and especially to insure that all personnel within an organization understand and will follow the MOC program requires practice.  As more MOCs are developed and approved, all personnel become more competent at evaluating change and meeting the requirements of the program.  Ever since the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) implemented the PSM standard in 1992, one of the hottest debate topics witnessed in plant offices is about replacement in kind.  OSHA and CCPS define a replacement in kind as meeting the design specification of the original.  This is a workable definition, but can cause some confusion when personnel are not well versed in PSM and risk management.

    The second simple thing which can be done to improve process safety management systems is to do away with the concept of replacement in kind.  Again, this does not have to be and probably can’t be accomplished throughout an organization; this can certainly be implemented at the process and plant level for a specified period of time.  The purpose of this change would be to end the debates and more importantly allow personnel an opportunity to practice and become competent at all the issues associated with performing changes.

    A real life example illustrates this:

    A Waukesha 7042 engine is scheduled for overhaul.  Three options are considered:

    • overhaul in place by company personnel,
    • overhaul in place with contract personnel
    • removal of engine and ship to contractor for overhaul.

    The most economical choice was found to be, swap the engine with another 7042 engine.  The only difference is the serial number.  This was determined to be a replacement in kind, and by definition it is.  However, the older 7042 engine was “grandfathered” under the facility’s air discharge permit from the environmental regulatory body.  As soon as a new engine, with a different serial number was installed, the “grandfathering’ of the older engine was invalid and a new air permit had to be issued.  To meet the requirements of the new permit, air/fuel ratio controllers and catalytic converters were required.  This change cost the company approximately $70,000 above the highest priced option that was analyzed.   This change also increased the workload on maintenance and operations staff, which could affect other areas of operations.

    During audits, there have been several instances where plant personnel try to stretch the replacement in kind exemption so that changes to the process are not evaluated with the MOC process.  The most frequent reasoning for this is that the MOC process is too cumbersome and takes too long.  In the end, the MOC process is being bypassed and potential hazards may not be addressed appropriately.

    The MOC process to, evaluate personnel changes, is used by some organizations, but generally it occurs for changes at the supervisory level.  But consider that no two people are the same.  Both have different skill sets and it is important to dig a bit deeper into the “design specification of the original” to determine what the real impact of personnel changes might be.  Especially consider the reassignment or replacement of operations and maintenance personnel.  Identifying gaps in their technical competencies should be an important part of the MOC evaluation.  The evaluation can be a powerful tool for performance management and identification of training opportunities for development.

    In the end, doing away with the replacement in kind exemption within a facility’s MOC process can increase the process safety competencies of all personnel.  Process safety competency is one of the elements of the CCPS Risk Based Safety Management guidelines.  Increased competency leads to a change in the culture and hopefully a safer process.  Within the world of adult learning, it is recognized that learners must be given the opportunity to apply lessons to the job or the training may be lost.  Considerable time and effort may be spent providing training to personnel on the procedures for managing change, but how often are they given the opportunity to put this training into practice within the working environment?

    The final simple thing will be presented in a future tip of the month.  If you would like a copy of the paper that was presented, please contact John M. Campbell & Co. and request a copy.

    To learn more about managing process safety systems, we suggest attending our PetroSkills HSE course, HS 45- Risk Based Process Safety Management or schedule a session of our two day Process Safety Case Study for Operations and Maintenance – OT 21, which can be found in our catalog.  To enhance process safety engineering skills we suggest any of the JMC foundation courses and watch for an announcement scheduling sessions of our newly developed,  PS 4 – Process Safety Engineering course.

    By: Clyde Young
    Instructor/Consultant

  • Three Simple Things to Improve Process Safety Management

    In this Tip of the Month, we look at how to deal with some of the challenges of managing process safety.  This TOTM is an excerpt of a paper presented by JMC Instructor/Consultant, Clyde Young at the 2008 Mary K. O’Connor Process Safety Symposium.

    “Process safety practices and formal safety management systems have been in place in some companies for many years.  Process Safety Management (PSM) is widely credited for reductions in major accident risk and in improved chemical industry performance.  Nevertheless, many organizations continue to be challenged by inadequate management system performance, resource pressures, and stagnant process safety results.”

    Meeting the challenges of a PSM system and insuring that the risk associated with our business is addressed can be challenging.  This is one of the reasons that the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) published their “Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety” in 2007.  This book is being used as a reference for the PetroSkills HSE course, Risk Based Process Safety Management.  During delivery of this course over the last couple of years, participants have agreed that one of the challenges facing them at the local level is that some elements of the PSM system they work with are somewhat complicated and are focused on trying to achieve consistency throughout an organization.  While the concept of having consistency throughout an organization is an excellent goal, issues at the local level sometimes make this difficult to accomplish.

    It is at the plant and process level that catastrophic incidents occur.   It is at this level where resources are sometimes stretched thin and the risk is increased.  What can be done at the plant and process level to simplify things and insure that hazards are identified, addressed and the consequences are reduced?

    It is important to know that all processes in the oil and gas industry are designed to run according to specified parameters.  Based on specific criteria, processes are designed to run at a specific flow rate, at specified pressures, temperatures and levels.  This should be considered “normal”.  Unless some kind of batch operation is being dealt with, processes in the oil and gas business are generally designed to run at “normal” for extended lengths of time.

    There are four characteristics of an effective management system.  These are:

    • formality,
    • flexibility,
    • accountability and
    • control

    A formalized management system uses procedures, policies, and guidelines to direct personnel to the correct actions and the best resources to manage the process.  A flexible system has mechanisms in place to react to conditions if they change.  It is not possible to foresee the future, but it is possible to know what to do, in a formalized way when a situation requires action.  In order for a system to work, people must be held accountable to perform the tasks that are required.  A system with accountability insures that there is no question about who is to do what.  Add these characteristics together, and the system becomes controlled.

    To meet the requirements of an effective PSM system, Process Safety Information (PSI) is required, which essentially documents how the process has been designed and built.  Conducting the required Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) study identifies hazards and operability problems that may be built into the process.  Well developed operating procedures directs how the process will be run during “normal” and what will be done to bring the process back to “normal” if there are deviations.  Providing training to personnel insures that those most exposed to the hazards and operability problems are competent to keep the process within the range of “normal” and return it if it deviates.   Mechanical integrity programs keep the equipment in the process from running to failure.  All of the above elements and others are basically used to define and maintain “normal” operations.

    In his book, “Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents,” James Reason talks about active and latent failures in his Swiss cheese model of defenses.  Active failures include errors, omissions, and violations.  Active failures have a direct and immediate effect on the process.  Latent failures include poor design, gaps in supervision, unworkable procedures, and lack of training. These latent failures are always there, may exist for years and can increase the likelihood of active failures.

    Process safety management systems are in place to manage the risk associated with the processes we operate.  To manage the risk, it has to be identified, reduced or eliminated.  Incidents have to be responded to and the consequences of such incidents have to be rectified.  Knowing that latent failures exist in all processes and systems, identifying these latent conditions is a key element of identifying risk.

    The first of the three simple things to improve process safety management is geared toward identifying risk and especially latent conditions.  Implementing an effective near miss/incident reporting system should help identify latent failures in our processes.

    Many organizations have already implemented a near miss/incident reporting program of some kind.  Some of these programs work very well.  In some cases, the program’s start well but reporting begins to taper off after a while.  This can happen because of perceived time constraints or management response that is inadequate or inappropriate.

    Whether the theory of H.W. Heinrich’s safety pyramid is to be believed, it would still seem reasonable that if there is a major incident, there were indications that the latent failures were starting to line up, so that the likelihood of an active failure is increased.

    Why do near miss/incident reporting systems fail to produce the results desired when they are first implemented? Some reasons include:

    • “It’s inconvenient to fill out a “near-miss form.” It’s less stressful to just forget it happened.”
    • Near-miss experiences are typically private affairs, and there’s no way to hold people accountable for them.
    • Organizational influences have an impact on near-miss reporting.
    • Slogans like “all injuries are preventable”. Employees think to themselves, “If all injuries are preventable and I almost got injured, I sure don’t want anyone to think I’m so careless.”

    While these reasons may well have an influence on the success of a near miss/incident reporting system, consider that people have a difficult time deciding if something is a near miss or an incident.  There are many different definitions of a “near miss”.  Incidents are sometimes categorized into tiers or levels and the reporting requirements for each tier are different.  Why can’t issues be simplified to ensure that all important information is collected and analyzed?

    To simplify things, let’s change the definition of a near miss/incident to:

    “Anything unusual that occurs.”

    Think about the concept that all processes are designed to operate as “normal”.  Any operator will tell you that a running process has a certain sound, vibration, feel and even a smell that is “normal”. An effective operator can tell something is not quite right almost immediately. The operator may not know exactly what isn’t right, but any changes to the “normal” are noticed.   All operators and all supervisors of operations need to know anything unusual that occurs.  The problem is that sometimes these things are passed along verbally or in operator logs and there is no formalized process in place to investigate further.  Remember, latent failures need to be identified before they become active failures.

    If a near miss/incident is defined as anything unusual that occurs, it becomes very simple to determine if something needs to be reported.  A strange sound or change in the feel of the process will lead to an investigation.  All near miss/incident reports must be investigated.  The investigation can be very simple or it can be very detailed and thorough.  It just depends on what has been reported.  A strange sound may only require someone to observe and write a brief description of what is found.  A failed pump seal may require a more thorough investigation that includes an audit of the facility’s mechanical integrity program.

    It is also important to communicate the findings of these investigations so that the latent failures are identified and eliminated or reduced.   Receiving no feedback about a report that is filed is one way to insure that personnel will stop reporting things.   Assigning blame and disciplining personnel is a sure way to drive near misses and incidents underground and insure that nothing is reported.  The focus should be on what happened rather than who did what.

    This formalized process doesn’t have to go on forever.  At some point, personnel will begin to understand that all unusual things need to be examined and perhaps even investigated.  The organizations culture will begin to move toward the generative culture where issues dealing with risk and safety are actively sought.  At this point, the organization can step back and take another look at the near miss/incident reporting program and modify it as necessary.

    Two other simple things will be presented in future tips of the month.  If you would like a copy of the paper that was presented, please contact John M. Campbell & Co. and request a copy.

    To learn more about managing process safety systems, we suggest attending our PetroSkills HSE course, HS 45- Risk Based Process Safety Management.  To enhance process safety engineering skills we suggest any of the JMC foundation courses, which can be found on our website or in our catalog.

    By: Clyde Young
    Instructor/Consultant

    1 Guidelines For Risk Based Process Safety, page ii, American Institute of Chemical Engineers,  Center for Chemical Process Safety

  • Providing a safe work place is good business:Learn from experience

    March 23, marked the three year anniversary of the BP Texas City refinery explosion.

    The United States Chemical Safety Board (CSB) recently released a detailed video of the event.  The video, Anatomy of a Disaster, provides an in depth look at the incident.

    Among other issues discussed, the CSB video shows what can happen when a corporate culture that values production over safety is not recognized and addressed.  As an industry, we have an obligation to provide a safe work place.  Providing a safe work place is also good business.  Every person working in our industry should learn what a generative safety culture is comprised of and strive every day to achieve that culture.

    In the book Managing the Risk of Organizational Accidents, James Reason describes a generative culture as one that:

    • Actively seeks safety information
    • Trains and awards the messengers
    • Shares responsibility
    • Welcomes new ideas
    • Institute far reaching reforms when failures occur

    Many of our organizations have implemented programs to try and move more toward establishing a generative culture. This change may take a significant amount of time and resources, but we owe it to ourselves and the newer generation of oil and gas industry personnel to implement and sustain this change.

    An organization’s process safety management (PSM) system can provide many tools to help establish a generative culture.  Elements providing guidance on safety information, hazard assessment, incident investigation, mechanical integrity, and contractor management are closely linked to actively seeking.  Management of change and the procedures for addressing hazard assessment and incident investigation recommendations provide an avenue for evaluating new ideas and managing far reaching reforms.

    Sharing the responsibility is a part of a good employee participation plan.  All personnel, from the roustabout to the chairman of the board should have a commitment to become competent within the system that has been established to manage an organization’s safety culture.

    The May, 2007 Tip of the Month, mentioned a statement from the Baker Panel report of the Texas City incident.  “……People can forget to be afraid.”  The Tip of the Month now is an accident prevention pillar from the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Risk Based Process Safety system.  Learn from experience.

    To learn more about the CCPS accident prevention pillars and changing your organization’s safety culture, check out PetroSkills HSE courses HS 45, Risk Based Process Safety Management and HS 44 Fundamentals of Risk Assessment. Our participant centered style of training that is used in PetroSkills Facilities courses provides an outstanding environment to learn from our experiences.

    By: Clyde W. Young