Campbell Tip of the Month

Category: Supply Chain Management

  • Process Safety and Low Oil Prices

    In this Tip of the Month, we reflect back to December 2008, and get a reminder from the United States Chemical Safety Board (CSB) to remain focused on process safety and accident prevention during this time of lower oil prices.

    During the economic downturn of 2008, oil prices dropped significantly. The latest drop in crude oil prices is similar. At that time, the CSB produced a video message asking companies to stay focused on process safety. That message is very relevant today.

    Process Safety and Low Oil Prices

    In the past, market conditions have occurred where oil prices have been low, such as we are experiencing today. Corporate cost cutting during these low oil price events have contributed to process safety incidents years later. In 2008, the United States Chemical Safety Board (CSB) Chairman John Bresland provided a reminder to oil companies that it is important to stay focused on process safety, even when prices are low. This was accomplished through a press release and a video safety message that is appropriate for this time [1].

    Low oil prices, combined with striking workers at US refineries increase the challenges faced by managers to insure that process safety is a core value of the organization.

    Containing overhead and operating costs during these market conditions may lead some to take shortcuts and make hasty decisions without considering all the process safety implications of these decisions. The attached press release and video safety message is as appropriate today as it was in 2008. This video message would be an excellent safety moment topic and hopefully will allow us to remain focused on process safety.

    Dec 22, 2008

    In First Video Safety Message, CSB Chairman John Bresland Calls for Industry to Remain Focused on Process Safety, Accident Prevention During Recession

    Washington, DC, December 22, 2008 – In his first video safety message, CSB Chairman John Bresland today said that chemical companies and refineries need to continue to invest in process safety and preventive maintenance, even as the economic downturn cuts into sales and profits.

    The four-minute video message was released on YouTube.com (http://www.youtube.com/safetymessages) and the text was posted on Blogger.com (http://safetymessages.blogspot.com).

    “My safety message for oil and chemical companies is clear: even during economic downturns, spending for needed process safety measures must be maintained,” Chairman Bresland stated in the message. He noted that the CSB investigation of the 2005 Texas City refinery disaster linked the accident to corporate spending decisions in the 1990s, when low oil prices triggered cutbacks in maintenance, training, and operator positions at the plant.

    “Unfortunately, around the country, refinery accidents continue to be a concern,” Chairman Bresland said, pointing to three major accidents that occurred at refineries in Texas this year, including a fire at a refinery in Tyler last month that fatally burned two workers and forced the refinery to shut down for months. “Today, as gasoline prices remain low, companies should weigh each decision to make sure that the safety of plant workers, contractors, and communities is protected.”

    Safety Messages are a new communication tool for the agency, consisting of short videos from the Chairman or the other board members. In the coming weeks and months, new messages will be released on a variety of current issues in chemical process safety.

    “I encourage all of our stakeholders to join the discussion on YouTube.com and Blogger.com and share their thoughts about the subject of these messages,” Chairman Bresland said. Comments and ideas for future Safety Messages can also be emailed to safetymessages@csb.gov.

    The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency’s board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.

    The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Visit our website, www.csb.gov.

    For more information, contact Daniel Horowitz at (202) 261-7613 or Hillary Cohen at (202) 261-3601.

    To learn more about process safety, we suggest attending our PetroSkills HSE course, HS 45- Risk Based Process Safety Management or PS-2, Fundamentals of Process Safety To enhance process safety engineering skills we suggest any of the JMC foundation courses or our, PS 4 – Process Safety Engineering course.

    PetroSkills offers consulting expertise on this subject and many others. For more information about these services, visit our website at http://petroskills.com/consulting, or email us at consulting@PetroSkills.com.

    By: Clyde Young

    Reference:

    1. United States Chemical Safety Board, Press Release, December 22, 2008.

  • The Importance of Leadership in Process Safety Management

    The first pillar of Risk Based Process Safety Management is “Commitment to Process Safety.”  A formalized mentoring system can ensure workforce involvement, compliance with company and regulatory requirements, increase the competency of personnel and enhance the process safety culture of the entire organization.  Within this element there are several essential features that lead to a more effective process safety culture.

    Providing strong leadership is critical for any organization that strives to manage the risk associated with the activities associated with process safety.  Leadership is a skill that is not necessarily intuitive to managers and mentors.  Leadership is a skill that can be learned.

    In this Tip of the Month (TOTM), we explore process safety leadership.

    This TOTM is part of a paper that was developed by John M. Campbell (JMC) Instructor/Consultants Clyde Young and John Kanengieter for presentation at the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) 9th Global Conference on Process Safety [1].

    Over the last several years, significant resources have been devoted to examining the issue of process safety culture, and strong leadership has been cited as a key element to enhance a process safety culture.  Study of major accidents within the oil, gas, chemical and allied industries have found that the safety culture of organizations is often proposed as a contributing factor, and development of a culture of process safety as the solution.  Presentations at symposia and conferences point to enhancing culture and providing leadership as necessary to address breakdowns in process safety management systems.

    The first pillar of the Center for Process Safety (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) is “Commit to Process Safety.”   Supporting this pillar is the element “Process Safety Culture”, which is defined as, “ the combination of group values and behaviors that determine the manner in which process safety is managed.”   One of the four essential features of process safety culture is “strong leadership.”

    Leadership

    What is “leadership”?  It has been described as “organizing or influencing a group to achieve a common goal”.  This would intimate that the leader is a boss or manager, but is a manager necessarily an effective leader?   There is considerable literature about leadership.  This literature includes quotes about leadership, how to find “natural” leaders and how to develop leadership skills.  There are workshops about leadership and even university degrees in leadership.  If there are so many resources dedicated toward understanding and teaching leadership, why is leadership listed as something that needs to be enhanced in symposia, papers and reports that deal with managing process safety in high hazard activities?  It may be because leadership and culture are considered human factors. When associated with process safety, they are known as factors that can lead to loss of the standards of consistently reliable human performance.  These standards are relied on as part of an organization’s defenses against process safety incidents.

    Every person working in the oil, gas, chemical and allied industries should perform their jobs under the guidance of a process safety management system.  CCPS defines a management system as a “formally established and documented set of activities designed to produce specific results in a consistent manner on a sustainable basis.”  Producing specific results in a consistent manner all the time requires that all personnel perform at a high level.  If culture is defined simply as “the way we do things around here”, this is influenced greatly by leadership.  But leadership doesn’t reside in the role of one person.  Leadership needs to be imbedded within the organization with every person.  This is a skill that can be learned by all and dependence on one individual with authority or one person who might be considered a “natural” leader can lead to failure of the system.

    When teams cease to function effectively and breakdowns are discovered in the system to manage process safety, it is highly likely that there is a breakdown in goals, roles and expectations in the team.

    Every person working in or supporting the operation of a high hazard process must be able to recite and explain the goal of every team they work with.  There should never be in any doubt what every team’s goal is.

    Because we may and probably do work on several teams, it is vital that we are clear of our role on each team.  What is my primary function to support achieving the goal? There should never be in any doubt what every person’s role is on that team.

    Does each person on the team have a concisely developed set of expectations for individual and team behavior?  Is there some way for the team to check that the expectations are being met?  What is the procedure for addressing deviation from expectations?

    A PetroSkills client recently asked for a one-day Overview of Risk Based Process Safety Management for Upper Level Management.  Four sessions of this overview have been delivered around the world to the business unit managers and their direct (team members) reports?.  Leadership and working as effective teams are two elements of the session that address the issue of process safety culture in this client’s operations.

    A key learning point offered by participants is that a clear understanding of goals, roles and expectations comes from leadership and exhibiting the appropriate leadership role.  Many leave the session with an action item to conduct team work sessions to establish/reaffirm goals, roles and expectations.

    If you would like a copy of the paper presented at the CCPS 9th Global Congress, contact PetroSkills.

    To develop process safety competency attend our PS-4, Process Safety Engineering;  HS-45, Risk Based Process Safety Management; and PS-2, Fundamental of Process Safety courses.  To develop competency in other skills, attend one of our other courses.

    John M. Campbell Consulting (JMCC) offers consulting expertise on this subject and many others. For more information about the services JMCC provides, visit our website at www.jmcampbellconsulting.com, or email us at consulting@jmcampbell.com.

    By Clyde Young

    PetroSkills Instructor/Consultant

    Reference:

    1.     Clyde Young and John Kanengieter, “Process Safety Management Mentoring:  Developing Leaders”, The (CCPS) 9th Global Conference on Process Safety,  the Center for Chemical Process Safety , April, 2013.

     

  • Debriefing Jobs Provides Several Benefits Associated With Process Safety

    A pillar of Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) is Learn from Experience.  The work we do and the processes we use to analyze our work provide significant learning opportunities to enhance process safety competency.  This is a derivative of Kolb’s experiential learning cycle [1], but many times we fail to take advantage of the learning opportunities available to us unless there is an incident or a near miss.

    This Tip of the Month (TOTM) will introduce a simple method for debriefing the job tasks we perform to close the loop on this cycle and capture appropriate data to develop competency, work safely and capture near miss/incident data quickly and efficiently.

    Conducting a simplified job hazard analysis will ensure that all hazards are identified, managed, and mitigated prior to performing work.  Performing a simple debrief at the conclusion of the work will ensure that we learn from the experience. By considering every job to be performed a learning opportunity, the experiential learning cycle can be used to identify what was done, how well it was done, and how we might improve in the future.

    This Month’s Tip was recently presented at the Mary K. O’Connor Process Safety Symposium at Texas A&M University [1].

    One of the pillars of the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety is “Learn from Experience.”  What does this mean?

    The elements of this pillar include:

    • auditing,
    • management review and continuous improvement,
    • measurement and metrics and
    • incident investigation.

    Each of these elements provides findings, lessons and data that are useful for learning and thus changing and enhancing behaviors and attitudes.  The change and enhancement will influence an organization’s culture and ultimately push the organization toward a learning culture.

    These are not the only opportunities available for organizations to learn from experience.  Metrics and audits can allow a general overview of process safety performance.  Incident investigation insures that when reported, incident information is transmitted to all who will benefit from the learning.

    The job hazard analysis process that many organizations use to identify and mitigate hazards provides a tremendous opportunity to capture data and use the experiential learning cycle if the job is debriefed properly after completion.  This paper will provide guidance and explain the benefits that can be derived from debriefing completed jobs.

    At the 2008 symposium, this author presented a paper entitled “Three Simple Things to Improve Process Safety Management.”  One of those simple things was to conduct a formalized Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) for the tasks being performed in the life cycle of a process.  That paper presented a checklist that could be used to guide personnel in the process of conducting a JHA.  (See checklist at end of this paper)

    Many facilities have embraced the concept of conducting JHA.  They may be called something else  (job safety analysis, job safety checklist, job task analysis) but the process is essentially the same.  The job or task is identified and analyzed step by step.  The analysis is to identify hazards that may be involved with each step and then develop strategies to mitigate the hazards.  This sounds simple in theory, but in reality there are many things that can and do go wrong with this process.

    To provide consistency and to make it easier to track that these analyses have been completed, standardized checklists and forms have been created that list the most common hazards that can be found with a job and logically guide the user toward identification and mitigation of hazards.  Experience shows that after these forms and checklists have been used regularly, some personnel have a tendency to try and short cut the process.  This leads to what is known as “pencil whipping” the JHA.  In other words, personnel will complete the checklist or form without actually performing the analysis required.   Familiarity with the forms and checklists may drive personnel to identify common hazards, but do little to mitigate the hazards.  For example, a common checklist item is “slips, trips and fall hazards”.  Personnel will identify that the ground is rutted or that there is ice on the ground, but few will actually smooth the ground or cover the ice with sand to mitigate the hazards identified.

    It is generally agreed among those who supervise personnel performing JHAs that the most important part of the process is not the completion of the forms and checklists but the discussion that happens among a group performing the work.  In order to focus the discussion and insure that all issues are addressed, the JHA checklist at the end of this paper can be used.  The JHA checklist is not intended to replace the checklists and forms that an organization may already have in place.  The JHA checklist can enhance the process by focusing a group’s thoughts on individual checklist items.  By answering each question a work group should be able to identify all issues associated with any job they are conducting.

    As work groups become more familiar with the JHA checklist and the process of discussing and documenting the efforts of the group, a simplified method can be adopted.  By answering six key questions, a group of workers can focus discussion on the issues that are most important.   The six questions and the benefits of using them include:

    What are we doing?  If we can’t answer this question completely and in simple terms, then we should not be doing the job.  A simple explanation will insure that all members of the team are working toward the same goal.

    What is the most dangerous part?  If we can identify the most dangerous part of what we are doing we have identified all hazards, ranked them and determined the most dangerous part.

    What will we do to protect ourselves?  Answering this question ensures that all mitigation measures have been put into place and that all personnel know what is being done.

    How will we know we are changing what we are doing?  To answer this question effectively, we will need to be creative and analytical.  Examination of the work site, knowledge of simultaneous operations, and competency in our job will be required.  Anticipating potential changes will insure that we are not surprised when things do change.

    What will we do about it?  Again, creativity and analytical thinking are critical here.  Many times we hear the phrase, “prior planning prevents poor performance”.  Effectively answering this question insures that performance will be as designed.

    How will we know we are finished?  Review of completed job hazard analysis documents has shown that it may be difficult to determine at what point the job is complete.  If the permit for the job being performed provides a scope of work like, “replace mechanical seal in hot oil pump”, once the seal is replaced, there are numerous tasks that still need to be performed before the job is complete.  Numerous times the JHA does not go beyond analyzing the tasks associated with the scope of work and do not consider additional tasks; like testing, clean up and turnover to operations.

    As previously mentioned, most supervisors believe that the discussion associated with this type of analysis is more important than the completion of the form used to show that the JHA has been performed.

    What about the form though?

    • What happens at the conclusion of the job?
    • Does anyone review the form to determine if all the hazards were found and mitigated?
    • Does anyone follow up with the work group to see if anything happened that made them change the work?
    • How should this review be performed and what are the benefits that will be gained by this?
    • How can we learn from our experience?

    Developing competent personnel is an ongoing process for most organizations.  A great deal of literature exists on the most effective methods of developing competency in adults. Training sessions are delivered using the concept of Kolb’s theory of the experiential learning cycle.  According to Kolb [2], this type of learning can be defined as “the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience.” [i] In other words, adults learn best when they are actively experiencing something and not just listening to lectures or instructor centered learning.

    Experienced trainers who deliver adult learning sessions use a process of debriefing to allow reflection, reinforce learning and help the learner apply the knowledge to their life.  It is generally acknowledged in the training industry that most real learning takes place in the debrief.  This is the opportunity for learners to reflect and develop knowledge from the activity, in our case the job performed.

    Very simply, debriefing a learning activity should focus on three questions.  What?  So What?  Now What?

    What? is the question that guides the learning toward reflection and what just happened.  This question provides a starting point to discover what everyone involved experienced.

    So What? is the question that leads to drawing conclusions and exploring alternate methods.

    Now What? leads to future planning and continuous improvement initiatives that will be used to strengthen the organization’s culture and work processes.

    If we return to question six of the job hazard analysis process, “How will we know we are done?”, the final answer for this question would be, “When we have completed the debrief of the job performed.”  There are five questions that should be used for debriefing a job.  These five questions, how they relate to the standard debriefing questions and the expected lessons to learn from them include:

    What did we do?  This is the opportunity for reflection and to insure that the job has been completed appropriately.  Each member of the team should come to agreement that what is being described is what was actually done.   This is the What of debriefing.

    Did anything change while doing the job?   Reflection on this question will lead the team to determine if the job was actually performed as it was initially described and analyzed.  This is the question that will also lead to identify incidents for investigation.  If anything unusual occurred during the task, reporting should be more efficient because the incident will be fresh in everyone’s mind.  Capturing these incidents and changes now will help modify future work orders and insure that we learn something from this experience.  This is the So What of the debriefing cycle.

    Did anybody get hurt?  This question should be answered with all personnel examining themselves for strains, pulled muscles, bumps, bruises, cuts, scrapes, twisted joints, twinges in the back and a general self examination for good health.  Any small injury or potential illness should be recorded here.   This will insure that a worker does not leave the job without reporting an injury or illness, and then visit a medical provider later because something cropped up.  Having someone discover they have been injured after leaving the worksite is a problem for managers.  This allows measures to be taken early to manage the injury or illness for reporting purposes.  Here and the next question is where more exploration of the “What” is performed.

    Did anybody come close to getting hurt?  This is the question that will capture near miss incidents quickly.  Near miss reporting programs fail for numerous reasons.  Lack of understanding, lack of motivation, blaming the reporter, and convenience of reporting are reasons that near misses may not be reported.  Reflection and discussion about the completed job will insure that any near miss is reported quickly.  This will lead to creation of a more comprehensive database that can be used to predict trends and identify problems areas in processes.

    What would we do differently?  This is the question that will tie everything together into a plan for the future.  Recommendations and action items should be generated from this final question so that future jobs can be analyzed with more speed and efficiency.  Potential training and competency development issues may be discovered.  Procedures for modification may be identified.  Latent conditions that are not readily apparent may be identified and mitigated before they become active failures.

    The Now What of the debriefing cycle is:

    • Conducting an effective job task analysis and following with an effective debriefing of the job will yield several benefits.
    • Competency gaps of personnel associated with the work will be identified.
    • Training topics and on the job mentoring for personnel with these identified gaps, can be more quickly delivered.
    • Procedural modifications that are necessary to insure that work is performed safely and efficiently will be quickly identified and addressed.
    • Potential process safety incidents will be quickly identified and investigated.
    • Near miss incidents will be reported quickly and the organization’s near miss/incident database will be enhanced.

    The process described in this paper can be expanded to any job and any work group.  Consider an engineering team who is working on the design of a new process to be considered for construction.  Conducting an effective job task analysis in the beginning stages of the project will insure that roles, goals and expectations are addressed and known.  Conducting an effective debrief at the conclusion, or even at selected stages of a project, will enhance the project team’s effectiveness and insure that all team members are always striving to meet the goal of the project.  The attached checklist for engineering projects, at the end of this paper, may be helpful for focusing a team’s efforts.

    Opportunities exist in all phases of operations and in all activities performed to keep processes safe.  It is important that all personnel be aware that learning from experience happens every day and these lessons learned need to be captured and stored for future use.

    To develop process safety competency attend our PS-4, Process Safety Engineering;  HS-45, Risk Based Process Safety Management; and PS-2, Fundamental of Process Safety courses.  To develop competency in other skills, attend one of our other courses.

    By Clyde Young

    PetroSkills Instructor/Consultant

    Reference:

    1.    Young, Clyde. ,” Debrief:  The experiential learning cycle, process safety competency, safe work practices, identifying and reporting of near miss/incident data”, Mary K. O’Connor Process Safety Symposium, Texas A&M University, October 29.

    2.    Kolb, David A. Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1984.

    Job Hazard Analysis Checklist

    1. PROCEDURES

    • ·What are the procedures for the task?
    • ·What is unclear about the procedures?
    • ·What order will we use these procedures?
    • ·What permits are needed for hazard controls?

    2. EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS

    • ·What are the right tools for the job?
    • ·What is the correct way to use them?
    • ·What is the condition of the tool?

    3. POSITIONS OF PEOPLE

    • ·What could we be struck by?
    • ·What could we strike ourselves against?
    • ·What can we get caught in/on/between?
    • ·What are potential trip/fall hazards?
    • ·What are potential hand/finger pinch points?
    • ·What extreme temperatures will we be in/around?
    • ·What are the risks of inhaling, absorbing, swallowing hazardous substances?
    • ·What are the noise levels?
    • ·What electrical current/energized system could we come in contact with?
    • ·What would be a cause for overexerting ourselves?

    4. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

    • ·What is the proper PPE?

    Hard hat, glasses/goggles, ear plugs, gloves, steel toe boots, respiratory system, fire retardant clothing

    5. CHANGING THE COURSE OF WORK

    • ·What would cause us to have to stop or rearrange the job?
    • ·What would cause us to change our tools or equipment?
    • ·What would cause us to have to change our position?
    • ·What would cause us to have to change our PPE?

    YOU HAVE THE RIGHT AND

    THE OBLIGATION TO

    STOP UNSAFE ACTS

    ENGINEERING JOB ANALYSIS

    1. PROCEDURES

    • ·What are the procedures for the task?
    • ·What is unclear about the procedures?
    • ·In what order will we use these procedures?
    • ·What is the proper timeline for these procedures?
    • ·What permits or permissions are needed for job controls?

    2. EQUIPMENT, TOOLS, DOCUMENTS

    • ·What are the right tools for the job? (software, simulators, matrixes, checklists, worksheets…)
    • ·What is the correct way to use them?
    • ·What forms will be needed for the job?
    • ·What documents will we need to produce?
    • ·What else do we need to know?

    3. INTERACTION WITH PEOPLE

    • ·What other departments need to know about this task?
    • ·Who are the personnel that need to know?
    • ·What other departments will supply information for this task?
    • ·Who are the personnel who will supply that information?
    • ·What could prevent other personnel or departments from supplying what we need?
    • ·What could prevent us from supplying what other departments need?

    4.  CHANGING THE COURSE OF WORK

    • ·What would cause us to have to stop or rearrange the job?
    • ·What would cause us to change our tools or equipment?
    • ·What would cause us to have to change our interaction with people?

    YOU HAVE THE RIGHT AND THE OBLIGATION TO

    STOP UNSAFE or UNPRODUCTIVE ACTS

  • What is Mentoring?

    What is Mentoring?

    In this Tip of the Month, we explore how process safety competency can be enhanced through mentoring programs.

    This TOTM is the paper that was developed by JMC Instructor/Consultants Clyde Young and Keith Hodges presentation at the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) 8th Global Conference on Process Safety in April, 2012.  The paper will also be published in the AIChE (American Institute of Chemical Engineering) publication, “Process Safety Progress.”

    Commit to Process Safety is the first pillar mentioned in “Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety Management”, published by CCPS.  This pillar is supported by five elements.  One of the elements is Process Safety Competency, which is associated with efforts to maintain, improve and broaden knowledge and expertise.

    In Greek mythology, Odysseus, King of Ithaca went to fight in the Trojan Wars. Before he left, he entrusted his son Telemachus to the care of his old and trusted friend MENTOR. It was some ten years before father and son were reunited and during this time the development and care of his son was with Mentor.

    What is often missing from historical accounts is that it is Athene, the Goddess of Wisdom, who appears to Telemachus in the likeness of Mentor and gives advice, encouragement and spiritual insight.

    Since then, the word Mentor has become synonymous with trusted advisor, friend and teacher, a wise person.

    Demographic studies of the oil and gas processing industry indicate that a large number of people are retiring and being replaced by younger, less experienced personnel.  This presents a challenge to the industry.  A wise mountaineer once stated, “Good judgment comes from bad experiences.” With the influx of less experienced personnel, it would be shameful to have their good judgment developed from their bad experiences.  Especially since these bad experiences can be catastrophic.

    Organizations in the industry have spent considerable resources recruiting the best talent available and most have a competency development program that these new workers enter.  The program will generally include a step to have a more experienced person provide feedback on the worker to assess competency in the job. Well-developed and resourced competency development programs will have a Mentor assigned to the worker.

    What does this really mean and how can an organization insure that process safety competency is developed in all personnel, even if process safety activities are not the primary role?

    This TOTM will provide some guidance and best practices for establishing Mentoring programs with an emphasis on developing process safety competency in the younger, less experienced workforce.

    The role of Mentor involves teaching, helping, protecting, challenging, motivating, guiding, coaching, listening, and providing career guidance; it falls short of counseling.  Counseling is the provision of professional psychological help and advice and chosen Mentors would be foolhardy to attempt such a role without extensive training.

    Mentoring is usually a formal or informal relationship between two people, a Mentor (usually and preferably outside the Mentee’s area of supervision) and a Mentee.  The Mentor can also be provided from an external organization. This can be preferable especially if there is any hint of competition between the Mentors and Mentees (e.g. working in the same department as peers).  There are different rules of engagement if the external option is taken and this is outside the scope of this paper.  Peer Mentoring can be a useful option, especially if a peer Mentor has specific skills and qualifications.

    Using a Mentee’s supervisor within a discipline should be avoided as there could be a conflict of interest.  The Mentor may be Mentoring one day and disciplining the next, This is not conducive to building trust, which is an important ingredient in the Mentoring process.

    Mentoring should not be substituted for conventional classroom or computer-moderated training. It enhances traditional training by allowing the Mentee to learn from experienced colleagues within the working environment.

    Choosing a Mentor

    The choice of Mentors is an important aspect of a program and managers should first be satisfied that a Mentor not only has the required technical skills, but also has the ability to convey those to others in an efficient and effective way. Competency associated with Mentoring skills does not necessarily come naturally to everyone with highly competent technical skills.  A key skill to insure effective process safety is communication with all disciplines that could have an impact on the process.

    Mentor Program

    It is foolhardy to think that just putting together a pool of people as Mentors and pairing them with Mentees is going to be an effective way to put a Mentor program together.  It takes planning and needs structure.  There has to be an organizational aim for the program with measurable objectives.  The Mentor should be provided with these and a list of roles and responsibilities, which they should fully comprehend.

    There should be a selection process for Mentors and organizations must recognize that a training program may have to be created for selected Mentors.

    Ideally the Mentee should be able to select the Mentor from a pool of people in the organization; management, the training department or HR should not pair them.  Mentors should have the option to refuse the role should they feel that it would not be appropriate.

    Mentoring and Process Safety

    A Mentoring program is not to be approached in a haphazard fashion if the goal is to develop competent personnel.  A Mentoring program is much like a process safety management system.  The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety Management (RBPSM) defines a management system as, “A formally established and documented set of activities designed to produce specific results in a consistent manner on a sustainable basis.”  The Mentoring program should be formalized, documented and designed to produce specific results.  The specific results are competent personnel associated with process safety.

    Mentees within a program may have been chosen because they are targeted to fill a key role within the organization.  This role could be a technical position that requires narrow skills in a field or a supervisory position of either engineering personnel or operations personnel.  The competency levels associated with process safety that are required will be highly dependent on the role in the organization.  The Mentor/Mentee relationship should keep this in mind as the process progresses.

    An effective Mentoring program that includes process safety as a key component will yield numerous benefits to the organization.  A Mentor with wide professional and technical expertise should have considerable experience in areas that involve process safety.  A Mentor that truly understands the concepts of risk based process safety will be invaluable to a Mentee with less experience.  Consider the pillars of RBPSM and some of the elements within each pillar.

    Commit to Process Safety

    Elements of this pillar include:

    • Process safety culture
    • Compliance with standards
    • Process safety competency
    • Workforce involvement
    • Stakeholder outreach

    A simple definition of culture is, “How we do things around here.”  Organizations strive to develop a learning culture that seeks hazards and solutions on a continuous basis.  It is imperative that Mentees are provided awareness level training on the organization’s culture and the Mentor will be given training on how to act as the example.  Two significant benefits will come from this.  The Mentors will examine their own actions within the culture and insure that they are setting a good example.  The Mentee will question why and how activities are accomplished and learn his/her role within the organization’s culture, which should accelerate the Mentees contribution through self-awareness.

    It will be difficult for a less experienced worker to learn the things required to insure compliance with all applicable standards.  An effective Mentor should always guide the Mentee toward the correct answer associated with compliance but not necessarily answer the question of compliance.  The guidance and allowing the Mentee to find the answer will insure that the learning associated with compliance will be retained long after the answer is discovered.

    Process safety competency of the Mentee will be enhanced significantly, but only if the Mentor insures that the Mentee is directed to the appropriate resources for this.  The Mentor does not necessarily have to be considered a process safety expert.  The Mentor does have to be aware that some process safety issues require a level of expertise that will be found elsewhere.  And sometimes those resources may be outside the organization.

    For a process safety management system to thrive, staff members at all levels of the organization must take an active role.  The role taken needs to be identified and metrics established to show participation in the role.  A Mentor can provide guidance and suggestions so that the Mentee is consistently working toward the goals of the process safety management system. Appropriately timed reviews of progress associated with established process safety metrics should be scheduled and conducted.

    Stakeholders include outside contractors, shareholders, community members and partners in joint ventures.  A Mentee may be involved with negotiations and planning activities associated with all kinds of stakeholders.  A Mentor’s experience in the industry and the organization can be very useful to insure that all stakeholder interests are addressed.

    Understand Hazards and Risks

    Elements of this pillar include:

    • Process knowledge management
    • Hazard identification and risk analysis

    Development of a Mentee’s competency in this pillar of RBPSM could be the Mentor’s most important role. Insuring that the correct process knowledge is developed and managed appropriately is a critical activity that the Mentee strives for. There is no need for a Mentee to learn from mistakes if a Mentor can provide clear guidance on this pillar.

    It is within these two elements that mistakes can lead to catastrophic events.  Having an incorrectly sized relief valve installed in a process or not anticipating the consequences of failure of controls is not acceptable. The Mentor and Mentee should routinely conduct discussions about these elements.

    Contract services are utilized a great deal for design of new and modified facilities.  A Mentor who has significant experience in this area can provide the Mentee advice and guidance for overseeing these projects.  Oversight by a qualified company representative will insure that all issues associated with a project have been addressed.

    Providing resources during the conduct of Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) studies is a challenge for many organizations. This is especially true considering the demographics of the industry at this time. More experienced personnel have moved on. PHA team members with significant experience are critical to the success of a PHA.  A Mentee who is assigned to a PHA team may or may not work side by side with their Mentor.  If the assigned Mentor is also a member of the PHA team, this may prove advantageous.  As the role of Mentor is to provide guidance and direction to new and developing staff, the PHA is an excellent environment to do just that.  The structure of the PHA provides an opportunity to guide the Mentee in the proper way to identify hazards, develop measures to mitigate those hazards and work as a team member in a formalized setting.

    Manage Risk

    Within this pillar, a Mentee will benefit from the guidance of an experienced Mentor to become proficient at what might be considered the day-to-day activities associated with their job.  Elements are:

    • Procedures
    • Safe work practices
    • Asset integrity
    • Contractors
    • Training and performance
    • Management of change
    • Operational readiness
    • Conduct of operations
    • Emergency management

    Sometimes organizations will assign a younger, less experienced person to a supervisory position in operations to “season” them. Studies have shown that a great number of incidents occur during normal operations.  Having a Mentor with significant operations experience will accelerate the “seasoning” process and insure that the problems associated with day-to-day activities do not lead to a catastrophic incident.

    Working in operations supervision will certainly expose the Mentee to many issues associated with personal interaction. Dealing with people may be one of the most difficult tasks undertaken. Having the ear of a Mentor can be helpful as the Mentee develops his/her skills in this area.

    Learn From Experience

    There is no reason that a young professional cannot learn from the experience of others. To pass along the experience and knowledge that has been gained over the years is the focus of a Mentoring program.   Hopefully, the Mentee will not have to experience a catastrophic incident to learn from experience.

    Elements within this pillar are:

    • Incident investigation
    • Measurement
    • Audits
    • Management review and continuous improvement

    Having a Mentor available to help review near miss reports, incident investigations, audit findings and metrics associated with process safety can provide the Mentee with a “cold eye” review of issues that are the Mentee’s responsibility to address.  Often a wiser, more experienced Mentor will have experienced some of the same things that are being discovered under the Mentee’s watch.  In this case, issues should be able to be addressed quickly and more efficiently.

    Troubleshooting

    All processes within the industries we work have been designed to operate in a specified manner. This manner includes specific temperatures, pressures, flow rates and levels.  Defining these specific parameters establishes “normal” for these processes.  Operating processes in a “normal” manner reduces the likelihood of a catastrophic incident.  Deviation from “normal” is not acceptable and identifying this deviation and taking the steps required to return to normal requires experience and knowledge. This is known as troubleshooting. Process safety management is a system that establishes “normal” and provides directions on maintaining “normal”. Personnel with effective troubleshooting skills will also work efficiently within an organization’s process safety management system.

    A formalized, well established Mentoring program for younger, less experienced personnel entering the business enhances everyone’s troubleshooting skills.  The Mentee has someone (the Mentor) available to query about issues seen and the Mentor is challenged to insure the advice and guidance provided is correct and useful.

    Attaining high-level competency in a job requires training and then performing the job for a period of time.  Accelerating the path to high-level competency is a significant goal of a formalized Mentoring program.

    Conclusion

    At the beginning of this TOTM, it was stated that the word Mentor has become synonymous with trusted advisor, friend and teacher, a wise person. Process safety management has become synonymous for reducing the risk associated with the activities performed in our industries.

    Risk is often viewed differently from individual to individual.  A person’s perception of risk may change with familiarity.  Having a trusted advisor for younger, less experienced personnel, to help identify and provide suggestions for mitigation of hazards, in all their forms, is a strong competency development tool for any organization.  Personnel will be developed quicker and more efficiently. Experienced personnel are one of a company’s most valuable resources.  Acting as a Mentor can be the best use of this resource and will provide a challenge that some people thrive on.

    Any organization that truly strives for a generative safety culture should do whatever it takes to implement a process safety-Mentoring program. The benefits will be seen and reaped for years to come.

    To learn more about managing process safety systems, we suggest attending our PetroSkills HSE course,  HS 45- Risk Based Process Safety Management.

    To enhance process safety engineering skills we suggest any of the JMC foundation courses or our, PS 4 – Process Safety Engineering course.

    John M. Campbell Consulting (JMCC) offers consulting expertise on this subject and many others. For more information about the services JMCC provides, visit our website at www.jmcampbellconsulting.com, or email us at consulting@jmcampbell.com.

    By: Clyde Young and Keith Hodges

     

  • Vigilance in Outside Contracting

    The Tip of the Month for May raised awareness of the role of process safety management (PSM) in preventing accidents. You may be aware that OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 determines what constitutes a PSM regulated facility and other laws such as Section 304 of the Clean Air Act address PSM training for employees. These are examples of efforts to drive increased vigilance for safety in industries such as Oil and Gas, but how are we applying this vigilance to our contracting processes? How do we avoid having outside contractors represent the highest percentage of reported injuries and fatalities or be the cause of them? There are a couple of keys to being on top of contractor safety management that apply to both engineering and contracting professionals.

    In many respects, contractor safety is inherently more difficult to maintain than the safety of our own employees. For one thing, multiple business cultures are involved when contractors are working on our sites. The contracting process must overcome differences in safety standards, attitudes, training and communications between all the parties. This may be a concern for a single project with multiple contractors and sub-contractors or it may result from a revolving door of unique contractors used to meet ongoing requirements for operations and maintenance activities. Vigilance in this case starts with recognition of the dynamic nature of the workforce involved.

    Secondly, there can be a general tendency with contracting terms and conditions, originally designed to raise the level of awareness and vigilance for contractor safety, to simply become safety “boilerplate” included in a mountain of documents. Warning signs of this problem can occur in two ways:

    • Data collected in the contracting qualification phase is simply reviewed for completeness and then filed without proper analysis for each specific job being contracted. A contractor might be PSM approved, have provided required OSHA logs and a list of Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) training programs and still not have dealt with a particular hazard that applies to the job in question. Who will uncover this information before the job begins?
    • Contract terms and conditions for safety become standardized (as they should), but there are little or no job-specific terms and conditions added in each contracting process (the one-size-fits-all contract syndrome). Who tells the contracting department what unique hazards are involved in each job? Does the contracting department require a job hazard analysis or pre-job meeting and safety plan when putting a contract together in order to expand the language appropriately?

    Example:

    According to a 2003 bulletin from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board on nitrogen asphyxiation, there had been 80 deaths and 50 injuries from asphyxiation over a period of ten years ending in 2002. Yet there have been instances since of workers and contractors not adequately warned or trained to avoid improper entry into an unsealed, confined space under a nitrogen purge.

    Regardless of any safety training documentation provided by the contractor or safety language commonly found in the contract, I would want to see a clear statement that this job involves work around a vessel containing nitrogen. There then should be a formal, documented acknowledgement that these workers (by name) are trained in the hazards of nitrogen purges and oxygen-deficient atmospheres and have been instructed about client company confined space entry rules. They must know that “oxygen deprivation rapidly overcomes victims, there is no warning before being overcome, oxygen-deficient atmospheres might exist outside confined space openings and rescuers must strictly follow safe rescue procedures.” A contractor safety plan might include required steps by the client to barricade the work area and post warning signs for a particular job. There may have been hundreds of other recent contracts that had nothing to do with this type of hazard and yet the contracting process needs to be able to put it on the table in this instance. It requires the help of everyone involved to identify, communicate and document these needs.

    Vigilance in contracting requires use of all the information we collect in the contracting process. For example, ISN is billed as the leader in Compliance Records Management and Reporting with more than 8,600 contractors and 100 owners using the service. As a result, most major oil companies are owner/subscribers to ISNetworld as a standard tool for HSE compliance among other things. How is the contracting function using this tool? In the interest of maintaining vigilance, is there a measure of this use?

    If 100 contracts are issued each month involving outside contractor work, how many inquires are made to ISNetworld to review and verify HSE records or information? Like tracking hits on a website when new marketing campaigns are launched, there should be a user metric that correlates to new contracts being issued. If inquiries are not being made as contracts are finalized, why not?

    In our PetroSkills approved course, SC-41 Contracts & Tenders Fundamentals, there is a role playing exercise that ties much of this discussion together. The scenario involves role playing as representatives of owner and contractor teams to review requirements for demolition of an old sulfur recovery plant. With the plant being out of service for 10 years and “hydrocarbon free,” there is a disagreement about the need and expense for gas tests on the lines to be removed and Nomex protective wear provided for the contract workers. How will a contract move forward?

    The first indication of contracting vigilance demonstrated in the exercise is simply in having such a meeting instead of just passing contractual documents back and forth prior to the work initiation. Second it demonstrates how this type of pre-job meeting will highlight the understanding, issues and concerns of both parties while providing the means to contractually document, communicate and monitor the resulting HSE requirements going forward.

    In May, Clyde Young concluded his Tip of The Month with the observation that safety culture can be defined as “the way we do things around here.” That certainly applies to working with outside contractors and should raise the question of whether constant vigilance is adequately built into the contracting process.

    To learn more about roles and responsibilities in contracting processes, we suggest attending our Contracts & Tenders Fundamentals course. Other Supply Chain, Operations Management and HSE courses may be found on our website.

    By: Ronn Williamson
    Instructor / Consultant