Campbell Tip of the Month

Category: Reliability Engineering

  • Improvements in the Steels Used in Oil and Gas Processing Equipment over the Last Half Century

    In the post-World war II period, the steels used in the oil and gas industry were quite different from what we use today. This tip of the month (TOTM) presents a brief overview of improvements in the steels used in oil and gas processing equipment for safer and more reliable operations.

    Plate was SA-285C a 55,000 psi (379 MPa) tensile steel that was relatively soft and easy to fabricate. It was not killed steel and therefore, not fine grain steel. The low tensile strength meant thicker vessels and because of poor welding techniques, spot or no radiography at all was common, making the items even thicker. Figure 1 shows a vacuum tower made of SA-285C from the 1950’s. This tower was constructed in 1961 by Chicago Bridge and Iron for the Shell Martinez Refinery in California.

    Figure 1. A vacuum tower made of SA-285C from the 1950’s. Shell Martinez serial #C-4201
    Figure 1. A vacuum tower made of SA-285C from the 1950’s. Shell Martinez serial #C-4201

    A plate designated SA-212B Firebox was in use for higher tensile applications. It had a 70,000 psi (482 MPa) tensile, but was coarse grained and had the undesirable characteristic of fracturing in the parent metal after thermal expansion and contraction over a period of time. Due to repeated failures in service, this material was removed from the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section II in 1968 as being unfit for thermal cycling.  Figure 2 presents a high pressure molecular sieve tower which was fractured by thermal cycling.

    Figure 2. An example of fracturing in a vessel made from the SA-212B Firebox steel.
    Figure 2. An example of fracturing in a vessel made from the SA-212B Firebox steel.

    Pipe used in the 1950’s was SA-53B, which could be Electric Resistance Welded or seamless. It was not killed steel. It had a 60,000 psi (413 MPa) tensile and was the pipe of choice for vessel, tank, and piping fabrication at the time.

    The forging of the 1950’s was SA-181, a 60,000 psi (413 MPa) tensile steel used for flanges, forged steel fittings, and heavy nozzles. It was not killed steel.

    Since none of these steels were killed, fine grained steels, their use declined rapidly as the industry moved into harsh environments such as the North Slope of Alaska and the processing of acid gases and sour crudes.

    Killed steel came into wide use during the 1960’s. Killed steel is produced in the ladle by adding silicon or aluminum to prevent further deoxidation of the heat. Molten steel contains dissolved oxygen which can cause bubbles in the cooling and solidification process. The addition of silicon or aluminum stops the reaction of the oxygen with carbon, producing a fine grain steel free from dissolved gases, highly homogenous with excellent fabrication properties.

    During the 1960’s, the SA-516 family of plate steels was introduced. These steels were silicon killed, fine grained, and produced excellent properties. The fine grain gave the steel impact resistance at temperatures down to -50 °F (-45.5 °C). The SA-516 suffix defines the tensile strength, 55,000, 60,000, 65,000, and 70,000 psi (379, 413, 448, and 482 MPa).

    • SA-516-55 was designed to replace SA-285C
    • SA-516-60 was designed for use in very cold service.
    • SA-516-65 was for intermediate tensile requirements
    • SA-516-70 was to replace SA-212B Firebox plate

    The chemical and mechanical properties of these four grades of steel overlap to the extent that one plate can actually meet all four specifications.

    Approximately 90% of all custom carbon steel pressure vessels manufactured for the oil and gas industry in the world today are made from SA-516-70 or its UNS (Unified Numbering System) equivalent. Figure 3 presents an example of a vertical drum made of SA-516-70.

    Figure 3. An example of a vertical drum made of SA-516-70
    Figure 3. An example of a vertical drum made of SA-516-70

    During the 1960’s SA-106 pipe replaced SA-53 as the pipe of choice.  Unlike SA-53B, SA-106B is seamless, killed, fine grain steel. It has a 60,000 psi (413 MPa) psi tensile.

    In 1978, SA-105 forgings replaced the SA-181 as the forging material of choice. SA-105 has a tensile of 70,000 psi (482 MPa), so the pressure ratings of B16.5 carbon steel flanges increased.

    Around the year 2000, the pipe manufactures improved their processes making SA-106 pipe to the point that they are able to meet the chemical and mechanical properties of SA-106B and SA-106C in the same heat.

    Since 2003, basically all SA-106 pipe is dual certified to SA-106B and SA-106C. This means that all three major components of a pressure vessel or shell and tube heat exchanger now have the same tensile strength, 70,000 psi (482 MPa). Figure 4 presents pipes made of SA-106.

    Figure 4. Pipes made of SA-106
    Figure 4. Pipes made of SA-106

    Austenitic Stainless steels (300 series) fifty years ago were made to straight grade (0.08 carbon) or “L” grade (0.03 carbon). Steel service centers had to maintain stocks of both grades. About 45 years ago, the stainless mills improved their manufacturing techniques to produce dual certified stainless steel, meaning that virtually all stainless in the steel service centers meets the criteria of 0.03 carbon for “L” grade but also meets the mechanical properties of straight grade.  Straight grades have a higher tensile allowing for the use of a thinner plate than “L” grade plate.

    Figure 5 presents an example of a separator made of stainless vessel. This 316 stainless separator is the first to be used offshore in place of a clad vessel. Since the temperature was low, the higher tensile allowed this item to be thinner, saving weight, and not require PWHT (Post Weld Heat Treatment), impact testing or special paint.

    Figure 5. This 316 stainless separator is the first to be used offshore in place of a clad vessel
    Figure 5. This 316 stainless separator is the first to be used offshore in place of a clad vessel

    Summary:

    In the last half century, the adoption of new technology in the manufacturing of fine grain steel plates, pipes and forgings has vastly improved the quality of the steels used in Oil and Gas Processing Equipment. Along with improvements in the welding processes used to construct Oil and Gas Processing Equipment, vessels, exchangers, piping and storage tanks are safer than ever before.

    To learn more about similar cases and how to minimize operational problems, we suggest attending our ME43 (Mechanical Specification of Pressure Vessels and Heat Exchanges), PF49 (Troubleshooting Oil and Gas Facilities), PF42 (Separation Equipment Selection and Sizing), G4 (Gas Conditioning and Processing), and PF4 (Oil Production and Processing Facilities), courses.

    PetroSkills offers consulting expertise on this subject and many others. For more information about these services, visit our website at http://petroskills.com/consulting, or email us at consulting@PetroSkills.com.

    John R. Curry

    Instructor and Consultant

    References:

    1. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section II, Part A., American Society of Mechanical Engineering, 1968.

  • Process Safety and Low Oil Prices

    In this Tip of the Month, we reflect back to December 2008, and get a reminder from the United States Chemical Safety Board (CSB) to remain focused on process safety and accident prevention during this time of lower oil prices.

    During the economic downturn of 2008, oil prices dropped significantly. The latest drop in crude oil prices is similar. At that time, the CSB produced a video message asking companies to stay focused on process safety. That message is very relevant today.

    Process Safety and Low Oil Prices

    In the past, market conditions have occurred where oil prices have been low, such as we are experiencing today. Corporate cost cutting during these low oil price events have contributed to process safety incidents years later. In 2008, the United States Chemical Safety Board (CSB) Chairman John Bresland provided a reminder to oil companies that it is important to stay focused on process safety, even when prices are low. This was accomplished through a press release and a video safety message that is appropriate for this time [1].

    Low oil prices, combined with striking workers at US refineries increase the challenges faced by managers to insure that process safety is a core value of the organization.

    Containing overhead and operating costs during these market conditions may lead some to take shortcuts and make hasty decisions without considering all the process safety implications of these decisions. The attached press release and video safety message is as appropriate today as it was in 2008. This video message would be an excellent safety moment topic and hopefully will allow us to remain focused on process safety.

    Dec 22, 2008

    In First Video Safety Message, CSB Chairman John Bresland Calls for Industry to Remain Focused on Process Safety, Accident Prevention During Recession

    Washington, DC, December 22, 2008 – In his first video safety message, CSB Chairman John Bresland today said that chemical companies and refineries need to continue to invest in process safety and preventive maintenance, even as the economic downturn cuts into sales and profits.

    The four-minute video message was released on YouTube.com (http://www.youtube.com/safetymessages) and the text was posted on Blogger.com (http://safetymessages.blogspot.com).

    “My safety message for oil and chemical companies is clear: even during economic downturns, spending for needed process safety measures must be maintained,” Chairman Bresland stated in the message. He noted that the CSB investigation of the 2005 Texas City refinery disaster linked the accident to corporate spending decisions in the 1990s, when low oil prices triggered cutbacks in maintenance, training, and operator positions at the plant.

    “Unfortunately, around the country, refinery accidents continue to be a concern,” Chairman Bresland said, pointing to three major accidents that occurred at refineries in Texas this year, including a fire at a refinery in Tyler last month that fatally burned two workers and forced the refinery to shut down for months. “Today, as gasoline prices remain low, companies should weigh each decision to make sure that the safety of plant workers, contractors, and communities is protected.”

    Safety Messages are a new communication tool for the agency, consisting of short videos from the Chairman or the other board members. In the coming weeks and months, new messages will be released on a variety of current issues in chemical process safety.

    “I encourage all of our stakeholders to join the discussion on YouTube.com and Blogger.com and share their thoughts about the subject of these messages,” Chairman Bresland said. Comments and ideas for future Safety Messages can also be emailed to safetymessages@csb.gov.

    The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency’s board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.

    The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Visit our website, www.csb.gov.

    For more information, contact Daniel Horowitz at (202) 261-7613 or Hillary Cohen at (202) 261-3601.

    To learn more about process safety, we suggest attending our PetroSkills HSE course, HS 45- Risk Based Process Safety Management or PS-2, Fundamentals of Process Safety To enhance process safety engineering skills we suggest any of the JMC foundation courses or our, PS 4 – Process Safety Engineering course.

    PetroSkills offers consulting expertise on this subject and many others. For more information about these services, visit our website at http://petroskills.com/consulting, or email us at consulting@PetroSkills.com.

    By: Clyde Young

    Reference:

    1. United States Chemical Safety Board, Press Release, December 22, 2008.

  • Impact of Gas-Oil Ratio (GOR) on Crude Oil Pressure Drop in Gathering Systems

    The use of multiphase flow systems is common practice in the oil and gas industry. Multiphase flow is often encountered in the well tubing, flow lines and gathering systems. For transport of oil and gas (and water) to downstream processing facilities the preference is normally a single pipeline in which both phases are transported simultaneously for economic reasons. Even in gas pipelines where the gas enters the line as a single phase fluid, condensation of liquids can occur due to pressure and temperature changes along the line.

    Modeling and simulation of a multiphase systems, even under steady-state conditions, is complex. There are a few tools designed specifically for modeling and analysis of complex multiphase systems such as PipePhase, PipeSim, OLGA, etc. [1].

    In the June 2008 Tip of the Month (TOTM), we demonstrated how general-purpose process simulation programs can be used to simulate gas dominated two-phase pipelines. In the August 2008 TOTM, we discussed the value of the simple Flanigan correlation and how it can be used to model and analyze the behavior of a wet gas transmission pipeline. The results of the Flanigan correlation were compared with more rigorous calculation methods for multiphase pipelines.

    In this TOTM, we will study the impact of gas-oil ratio (GOR) on pressure drop in crude oil gathering systems. Specifically, pressure drop along a gathering line for nominal pressures of 690, 3450, and 6900 kPag (100, 500, and 1000 psig) and nominal pipe size of 101.6 and 152.4 mm (4 and 6 inches) was calculated using multiphase rigorous method from commercial simulator. The calculated pressure drops are presented in graphical format as a function of the oil stock tank volume flow rate and GOR. Variation of thermo physical properties was considered.

    Case Study

    For the purpose of illustration, we considered a case study for transporting a crude oil of relative density of 0.852 (°API = 34.6) at stock tank condition combined with a gas with relative density of 0.751. The selected GORs were 0 (dead oil), 17.8, 356.5, and 891.3 Sm3 of gas/STm3 of oil (0, 100, 2000, and 5000 scf/STB). The compositions of oil and gas are presented in Table 1. The oil C6+ was characterized as 30 single carbon number (SCN) [2] ranging from SCN6 to SCN35 while the gas C6+ was characterized by 10 SCN ranging from SCN6 to SCN15. For details of the SCN components, see Table 3.2 on page 64 of reference [2]. The mole fraction of SCN components were determined by an exponential decay algorithm [3].

    Table 1. Feed composition at stock condition

    table1

    The following assumptions were made:

    1. Steady state conditions
    2. The line is 1.601 km (1 mile) long with nominal size of 101.6 and 152.4mm (4 and 6 inches), onshore buried line.
    3. Segment lengths and elevation changes are presented in Table 2. This elevation profile is considered to be approximately equivalent to “rolling” terrain.
    4. Pipeline inside surface roughness of 46 microns (0.046 mm, 0.0018 inch)
    5. Line nominal pressure 690, 3450, and 6900 kPag (100, 500, and 1000 psig)
    6. The feed enters the line at 15.6 ˚C and (60 ˚F)
    7. The ground/ambient temperature, is 15.6 ˚C and (60 ˚F)
    8. Water cut is 0 (no water in the feed).
    9. Overall heat transfer coefficients of 2.839 W/m2-˚C (0.5 Btu/hr-ft2-˚F), for onshore buried line (minor effect as inlet temperature = ambient ground temperature).
    10. Simulation software ProMax [4] and using the Soave-Redlich-Kwong (SRK) Equation of State [5] for vapor-liquid equilibrium and Beggs-Brill method for two-phase pressure drop calculation [6].

    Table 2. Line segment length and elevation change

    table2

    Results and Discussions:

    The two phase (oil and gas) flow through the gathering line was simulated by ProMax with SRK EOS for vapor-liquid equilibria and Beggs-Brill for two phase pressure drop calculations. Figures 1A and 1B present the calculated pressure drop per unit length as a function of oil stock tank volume rate and GOR for nominal line diameter of 101.6 mm (4 inches) at nominal line pressure of 690 kPag (100 psig) in SI (international) and FPS (Engineering) system of units, respectively. Figures 1A and 1B indicate that as the GOR increases from 0 to 891 Sm3/STm3 (0 to 5000 scf/STB), the pressure drop increases considerably. Consequently, as the GOR increases, the line capacity decreases.

    Figures 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B present the results for the same line size but at nominal pressures of 3445 and 6900 kPag (500 and 1000 psig), respectively. Contrary to Figure 1, Figures 2 and 3 indicate that at these higher pressures as the GOR increases, the pressure drop decreases for low GOR value. However, for further increase of GOR the pressure drop increases considerably.

    Similar calculations were repeated for another line with nominal pipe size of 152.4 mm (6 inches) and the simulation results are presented in Figures 4 through 6. Figures 4 through 6 also demonstrate the same impact of GOR on the pressure drop, at higher pressures and low GOR, the pressure drop decreases. However, the impact of low GOR at higher pressures is less compared to the smaller line diameter.

    fig1a

    Figure 1A (SI). Variation of pressure drop per unit length with oil stock tank volume rate and GOR at 690 kPag for 101.6 mm pipe diameter

    fig1b

    Figure 1B (FPS). Variation of pressure drop per unit length with oil stock tank volume rate and GOR at 100 psig for 4 in pipe diameter

    fig2a

    Figure 2A (SI). Variation of pressure drop per unit length with oil stock tank volume rate and GOR at 3445 kPag for 101.6 mm pipe diameter

    fig2b

    Figure 2B (FPS). Variation of pressure drop per unit length with oil stock tank volume rate and GOR at 500 psig for 4 in pipe diameter

    fig3a

    Figure 3A (SI). Variation of pressure drop per unit length with oil stock tank volume rate and GOR at 6900 kPag for 101.6 mm pipe diameter

    fig3b

    Figure 3B (FPS). Variation of pressure drop per unit length with oil stock tank volume rate and GOR at 1000 psig for 4 in pipe diameter

    Conclusions

    The following conclusions can be made based on this case study:

    1. The GOR has a large impact on the capacity of crude oil gathering lines. In general as GOR increases the pressure drop increases which lowers the line capacity.
    2. At high pressures and low GOR, pressure drop is lower than the pressure drop for dead oil (solution gas is zero) because the viscosity of live oil is lower than viscosity of dead oil. This effect is bigger for the smaller line diameter.

    To learn more about similar cases and how to minimize operational problems, we suggest attending our PF 45 (Onshore Gas Gathering Systems: Design and Operation), G4 (Gas Conditioning and Processing), PF81 (CO2 Surface Facilities), PF4 (Oil Production and Processing Facilities), and PL4 (Fundamentals of Onshore and Offshore Pipeline Systems) courses.

    John M. Campbell Consulting (JMCC) offers consulting expertise on this subject and many others. For more information about the services JMCC provides, visit our website at www.jmcampbellconsulting.com, or email us at consulting@jmcampbell.com.

    By: Mahmood Moshfeghian

    Reference:

    1. Ellul, I. R., Saether, G. and Shippen, M. E., “The Modeling of Multiphase Systems under Steady-State and Transient Conditions – A Tutorial,” The Proceeding of Pipeline Simulation Interest Group, Paper PSIG 0403, Palm Spring, California, 2004.
    2. Campbell, J.M., Gas Conditioning and Processing, Volume 1: The Basic Principles, 9th Edition, 2nd Printing, Editors Hubbard, R. and Snow–McGregor, K., Campbell Petroleum Series, Norman, Oklahoma, 2014.
    3. Moshfeghian, M., Maddox, R.N., and A.H. Johannes, “Application of Exponential Decay Distribution of C6+ Cut for Lean Natural Gas Phase Envelope,” J. of Chem. Engr. Japan, Vol 39, No 4, pp.375-382 (2006)
    4. ProMax 3.2, Bryan Research and Engineering, Inc., Bryan, Texas, 2014.
    5. Soave, G., Eng. Sci. Vol. 27, No. 6, p. 1197, 1972.

    Brill, J. P., et al., “Analysis of Two-Phase Tests in Large-Diameter Flow Lines in Prudhoe Bay Field,” SPE Jour, p. 363-78, June 1981.

    fig4a

    Figure 4A (SI). Variation of pressure drop per unit length with oil stock tank volume rate and GOR at 690 kPag for 152.4 mm pipe diameter

    fig4b

    Figure 4B (FPS). Variation of pressure drop per unit length with oil stock tank volume rate and GOR at 100 psig for 6 in pipe diameter

    fig5a

    Figure 5A (SI). Variation of pressure drop per unit length with oil stock tank volume rate and GOR at 3445 kPag for 152.4 mm pipe diameter

    fig5b

    Figure 5B (FPS). Variation of pressure drop per unit length with oil stock tank volume rate and GOR at 500 psig for 6 in pipe diameter

    fig6a

    Figure 6A (SI). Variation of pressure drop per unit length with oil stock tank volume rate and GOR at 6900 kPag for 152.4 mm pipe diameter

    fig6b

    Figure 6B (FPS). Variation of pressure drop per unit length with oil stock tank volume rate and GOR at 1000 psig for 6 in pipe diameter

  • The Importance of Leadership in Process Safety Management

    The first pillar of Risk Based Process Safety Management is “Commitment to Process Safety.”  A formalized mentoring system can ensure workforce involvement, compliance with company and regulatory requirements, increase the competency of personnel and enhance the process safety culture of the entire organization.  Within this element there are several essential features that lead to a more effective process safety culture.

    Providing strong leadership is critical for any organization that strives to manage the risk associated with the activities associated with process safety.  Leadership is a skill that is not necessarily intuitive to managers and mentors.  Leadership is a skill that can be learned.

    In this Tip of the Month (TOTM), we explore process safety leadership.

    This TOTM is part of a paper that was developed by John M. Campbell (JMC) Instructor/Consultants Clyde Young and John Kanengieter for presentation at the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) 9th Global Conference on Process Safety [1].

    Over the last several years, significant resources have been devoted to examining the issue of process safety culture, and strong leadership has been cited as a key element to enhance a process safety culture.  Study of major accidents within the oil, gas, chemical and allied industries have found that the safety culture of organizations is often proposed as a contributing factor, and development of a culture of process safety as the solution.  Presentations at symposia and conferences point to enhancing culture and providing leadership as necessary to address breakdowns in process safety management systems.

    The first pillar of the Center for Process Safety (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) is “Commit to Process Safety.”   Supporting this pillar is the element “Process Safety Culture”, which is defined as, “ the combination of group values and behaviors that determine the manner in which process safety is managed.”   One of the four essential features of process safety culture is “strong leadership.”

    Leadership

    What is “leadership”?  It has been described as “organizing or influencing a group to achieve a common goal”.  This would intimate that the leader is a boss or manager, but is a manager necessarily an effective leader?   There is considerable literature about leadership.  This literature includes quotes about leadership, how to find “natural” leaders and how to develop leadership skills.  There are workshops about leadership and even university degrees in leadership.  If there are so many resources dedicated toward understanding and teaching leadership, why is leadership listed as something that needs to be enhanced in symposia, papers and reports that deal with managing process safety in high hazard activities?  It may be because leadership and culture are considered human factors. When associated with process safety, they are known as factors that can lead to loss of the standards of consistently reliable human performance.  These standards are relied on as part of an organization’s defenses against process safety incidents.

    Every person working in the oil, gas, chemical and allied industries should perform their jobs under the guidance of a process safety management system.  CCPS defines a management system as a “formally established and documented set of activities designed to produce specific results in a consistent manner on a sustainable basis.”  Producing specific results in a consistent manner all the time requires that all personnel perform at a high level.  If culture is defined simply as “the way we do things around here”, this is influenced greatly by leadership.  But leadership doesn’t reside in the role of one person.  Leadership needs to be imbedded within the organization with every person.  This is a skill that can be learned by all and dependence on one individual with authority or one person who might be considered a “natural” leader can lead to failure of the system.

    When teams cease to function effectively and breakdowns are discovered in the system to manage process safety, it is highly likely that there is a breakdown in goals, roles and expectations in the team.

    Every person working in or supporting the operation of a high hazard process must be able to recite and explain the goal of every team they work with.  There should never be in any doubt what every team’s goal is.

    Because we may and probably do work on several teams, it is vital that we are clear of our role on each team.  What is my primary function to support achieving the goal? There should never be in any doubt what every person’s role is on that team.

    Does each person on the team have a concisely developed set of expectations for individual and team behavior?  Is there some way for the team to check that the expectations are being met?  What is the procedure for addressing deviation from expectations?

    A PetroSkills client recently asked for a one-day Overview of Risk Based Process Safety Management for Upper Level Management.  Four sessions of this overview have been delivered around the world to the business unit managers and their direct (team members) reports?.  Leadership and working as effective teams are two elements of the session that address the issue of process safety culture in this client’s operations.

    A key learning point offered by participants is that a clear understanding of goals, roles and expectations comes from leadership and exhibiting the appropriate leadership role.  Many leave the session with an action item to conduct team work sessions to establish/reaffirm goals, roles and expectations.

    If you would like a copy of the paper presented at the CCPS 9th Global Congress, contact PetroSkills.

    To develop process safety competency attend our PS-4, Process Safety Engineering;  HS-45, Risk Based Process Safety Management; and PS-2, Fundamental of Process Safety courses.  To develop competency in other skills, attend one of our other courses.

    John M. Campbell Consulting (JMCC) offers consulting expertise on this subject and many others. For more information about the services JMCC provides, visit our website at www.jmcampbellconsulting.com, or email us at consulting@jmcampbell.com.

    By Clyde Young

    PetroSkills Instructor/Consultant

    Reference:

    1.     Clyde Young and John Kanengieter, “Process Safety Management Mentoring:  Developing Leaders”, The (CCPS) 9th Global Conference on Process Safety,  the Center for Chemical Process Safety , April, 2013.

     

  • Debriefing Jobs Provides Several Benefits Associated With Process Safety

    A pillar of Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) is Learn from Experience.  The work we do and the processes we use to analyze our work provide significant learning opportunities to enhance process safety competency.  This is a derivative of Kolb’s experiential learning cycle [1], but many times we fail to take advantage of the learning opportunities available to us unless there is an incident or a near miss.

    This Tip of the Month (TOTM) will introduce a simple method for debriefing the job tasks we perform to close the loop on this cycle and capture appropriate data to develop competency, work safely and capture near miss/incident data quickly and efficiently.

    Conducting a simplified job hazard analysis will ensure that all hazards are identified, managed, and mitigated prior to performing work.  Performing a simple debrief at the conclusion of the work will ensure that we learn from the experience. By considering every job to be performed a learning opportunity, the experiential learning cycle can be used to identify what was done, how well it was done, and how we might improve in the future.

    This Month’s Tip was recently presented at the Mary K. O’Connor Process Safety Symposium at Texas A&M University [1].

    One of the pillars of the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety is “Learn from Experience.”  What does this mean?

    The elements of this pillar include:

    • auditing,
    • management review and continuous improvement,
    • measurement and metrics and
    • incident investigation.

    Each of these elements provides findings, lessons and data that are useful for learning and thus changing and enhancing behaviors and attitudes.  The change and enhancement will influence an organization’s culture and ultimately push the organization toward a learning culture.

    These are not the only opportunities available for organizations to learn from experience.  Metrics and audits can allow a general overview of process safety performance.  Incident investigation insures that when reported, incident information is transmitted to all who will benefit from the learning.

    The job hazard analysis process that many organizations use to identify and mitigate hazards provides a tremendous opportunity to capture data and use the experiential learning cycle if the job is debriefed properly after completion.  This paper will provide guidance and explain the benefits that can be derived from debriefing completed jobs.

    At the 2008 symposium, this author presented a paper entitled “Three Simple Things to Improve Process Safety Management.”  One of those simple things was to conduct a formalized Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) for the tasks being performed in the life cycle of a process.  That paper presented a checklist that could be used to guide personnel in the process of conducting a JHA.  (See checklist at end of this paper)

    Many facilities have embraced the concept of conducting JHA.  They may be called something else  (job safety analysis, job safety checklist, job task analysis) but the process is essentially the same.  The job or task is identified and analyzed step by step.  The analysis is to identify hazards that may be involved with each step and then develop strategies to mitigate the hazards.  This sounds simple in theory, but in reality there are many things that can and do go wrong with this process.

    To provide consistency and to make it easier to track that these analyses have been completed, standardized checklists and forms have been created that list the most common hazards that can be found with a job and logically guide the user toward identification and mitigation of hazards.  Experience shows that after these forms and checklists have been used regularly, some personnel have a tendency to try and short cut the process.  This leads to what is known as “pencil whipping” the JHA.  In other words, personnel will complete the checklist or form without actually performing the analysis required.   Familiarity with the forms and checklists may drive personnel to identify common hazards, but do little to mitigate the hazards.  For example, a common checklist item is “slips, trips and fall hazards”.  Personnel will identify that the ground is rutted or that there is ice on the ground, but few will actually smooth the ground or cover the ice with sand to mitigate the hazards identified.

    It is generally agreed among those who supervise personnel performing JHAs that the most important part of the process is not the completion of the forms and checklists but the discussion that happens among a group performing the work.  In order to focus the discussion and insure that all issues are addressed, the JHA checklist at the end of this paper can be used.  The JHA checklist is not intended to replace the checklists and forms that an organization may already have in place.  The JHA checklist can enhance the process by focusing a group’s thoughts on individual checklist items.  By answering each question a work group should be able to identify all issues associated with any job they are conducting.

    As work groups become more familiar with the JHA checklist and the process of discussing and documenting the efforts of the group, a simplified method can be adopted.  By answering six key questions, a group of workers can focus discussion on the issues that are most important.   The six questions and the benefits of using them include:

    What are we doing?  If we can’t answer this question completely and in simple terms, then we should not be doing the job.  A simple explanation will insure that all members of the team are working toward the same goal.

    What is the most dangerous part?  If we can identify the most dangerous part of what we are doing we have identified all hazards, ranked them and determined the most dangerous part.

    What will we do to protect ourselves?  Answering this question ensures that all mitigation measures have been put into place and that all personnel know what is being done.

    How will we know we are changing what we are doing?  To answer this question effectively, we will need to be creative and analytical.  Examination of the work site, knowledge of simultaneous operations, and competency in our job will be required.  Anticipating potential changes will insure that we are not surprised when things do change.

    What will we do about it?  Again, creativity and analytical thinking are critical here.  Many times we hear the phrase, “prior planning prevents poor performance”.  Effectively answering this question insures that performance will be as designed.

    How will we know we are finished?  Review of completed job hazard analysis documents has shown that it may be difficult to determine at what point the job is complete.  If the permit for the job being performed provides a scope of work like, “replace mechanical seal in hot oil pump”, once the seal is replaced, there are numerous tasks that still need to be performed before the job is complete.  Numerous times the JHA does not go beyond analyzing the tasks associated with the scope of work and do not consider additional tasks; like testing, clean up and turnover to operations.

    As previously mentioned, most supervisors believe that the discussion associated with this type of analysis is more important than the completion of the form used to show that the JHA has been performed.

    What about the form though?

    • What happens at the conclusion of the job?
    • Does anyone review the form to determine if all the hazards were found and mitigated?
    • Does anyone follow up with the work group to see if anything happened that made them change the work?
    • How should this review be performed and what are the benefits that will be gained by this?
    • How can we learn from our experience?

    Developing competent personnel is an ongoing process for most organizations.  A great deal of literature exists on the most effective methods of developing competency in adults. Training sessions are delivered using the concept of Kolb’s theory of the experiential learning cycle.  According to Kolb [2], this type of learning can be defined as “the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience.” [i] In other words, adults learn best when they are actively experiencing something and not just listening to lectures or instructor centered learning.

    Experienced trainers who deliver adult learning sessions use a process of debriefing to allow reflection, reinforce learning and help the learner apply the knowledge to their life.  It is generally acknowledged in the training industry that most real learning takes place in the debrief.  This is the opportunity for learners to reflect and develop knowledge from the activity, in our case the job performed.

    Very simply, debriefing a learning activity should focus on three questions.  What?  So What?  Now What?

    What? is the question that guides the learning toward reflection and what just happened.  This question provides a starting point to discover what everyone involved experienced.

    So What? is the question that leads to drawing conclusions and exploring alternate methods.

    Now What? leads to future planning and continuous improvement initiatives that will be used to strengthen the organization’s culture and work processes.

    If we return to question six of the job hazard analysis process, “How will we know we are done?”, the final answer for this question would be, “When we have completed the debrief of the job performed.”  There are five questions that should be used for debriefing a job.  These five questions, how they relate to the standard debriefing questions and the expected lessons to learn from them include:

    What did we do?  This is the opportunity for reflection and to insure that the job has been completed appropriately.  Each member of the team should come to agreement that what is being described is what was actually done.   This is the What of debriefing.

    Did anything change while doing the job?   Reflection on this question will lead the team to determine if the job was actually performed as it was initially described and analyzed.  This is the question that will also lead to identify incidents for investigation.  If anything unusual occurred during the task, reporting should be more efficient because the incident will be fresh in everyone’s mind.  Capturing these incidents and changes now will help modify future work orders and insure that we learn something from this experience.  This is the So What of the debriefing cycle.

    Did anybody get hurt?  This question should be answered with all personnel examining themselves for strains, pulled muscles, bumps, bruises, cuts, scrapes, twisted joints, twinges in the back and a general self examination for good health.  Any small injury or potential illness should be recorded here.   This will insure that a worker does not leave the job without reporting an injury or illness, and then visit a medical provider later because something cropped up.  Having someone discover they have been injured after leaving the worksite is a problem for managers.  This allows measures to be taken early to manage the injury or illness for reporting purposes.  Here and the next question is where more exploration of the “What” is performed.

    Did anybody come close to getting hurt?  This is the question that will capture near miss incidents quickly.  Near miss reporting programs fail for numerous reasons.  Lack of understanding, lack of motivation, blaming the reporter, and convenience of reporting are reasons that near misses may not be reported.  Reflection and discussion about the completed job will insure that any near miss is reported quickly.  This will lead to creation of a more comprehensive database that can be used to predict trends and identify problems areas in processes.

    What would we do differently?  This is the question that will tie everything together into a plan for the future.  Recommendations and action items should be generated from this final question so that future jobs can be analyzed with more speed and efficiency.  Potential training and competency development issues may be discovered.  Procedures for modification may be identified.  Latent conditions that are not readily apparent may be identified and mitigated before they become active failures.

    The Now What of the debriefing cycle is:

    • Conducting an effective job task analysis and following with an effective debriefing of the job will yield several benefits.
    • Competency gaps of personnel associated with the work will be identified.
    • Training topics and on the job mentoring for personnel with these identified gaps, can be more quickly delivered.
    • Procedural modifications that are necessary to insure that work is performed safely and efficiently will be quickly identified and addressed.
    • Potential process safety incidents will be quickly identified and investigated.
    • Near miss incidents will be reported quickly and the organization’s near miss/incident database will be enhanced.

    The process described in this paper can be expanded to any job and any work group.  Consider an engineering team who is working on the design of a new process to be considered for construction.  Conducting an effective job task analysis in the beginning stages of the project will insure that roles, goals and expectations are addressed and known.  Conducting an effective debrief at the conclusion, or even at selected stages of a project, will enhance the project team’s effectiveness and insure that all team members are always striving to meet the goal of the project.  The attached checklist for engineering projects, at the end of this paper, may be helpful for focusing a team’s efforts.

    Opportunities exist in all phases of operations and in all activities performed to keep processes safe.  It is important that all personnel be aware that learning from experience happens every day and these lessons learned need to be captured and stored for future use.

    To develop process safety competency attend our PS-4, Process Safety Engineering;  HS-45, Risk Based Process Safety Management; and PS-2, Fundamental of Process Safety courses.  To develop competency in other skills, attend one of our other courses.

    By Clyde Young

    PetroSkills Instructor/Consultant

    Reference:

    1.    Young, Clyde. ,” Debrief:  The experiential learning cycle, process safety competency, safe work practices, identifying and reporting of near miss/incident data”, Mary K. O’Connor Process Safety Symposium, Texas A&M University, October 29.

    2.    Kolb, David A. Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1984.

    Job Hazard Analysis Checklist

    1. PROCEDURES

    • ·What are the procedures for the task?
    • ·What is unclear about the procedures?
    • ·What order will we use these procedures?
    • ·What permits are needed for hazard controls?

    2. EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS

    • ·What are the right tools for the job?
    • ·What is the correct way to use them?
    • ·What is the condition of the tool?

    3. POSITIONS OF PEOPLE

    • ·What could we be struck by?
    • ·What could we strike ourselves against?
    • ·What can we get caught in/on/between?
    • ·What are potential trip/fall hazards?
    • ·What are potential hand/finger pinch points?
    • ·What extreme temperatures will we be in/around?
    • ·What are the risks of inhaling, absorbing, swallowing hazardous substances?
    • ·What are the noise levels?
    • ·What electrical current/energized system could we come in contact with?
    • ·What would be a cause for overexerting ourselves?

    4. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

    • ·What is the proper PPE?

    Hard hat, glasses/goggles, ear plugs, gloves, steel toe boots, respiratory system, fire retardant clothing

    5. CHANGING THE COURSE OF WORK

    • ·What would cause us to have to stop or rearrange the job?
    • ·What would cause us to change our tools or equipment?
    • ·What would cause us to have to change our position?
    • ·What would cause us to have to change our PPE?

    YOU HAVE THE RIGHT AND

    THE OBLIGATION TO

    STOP UNSAFE ACTS

    ENGINEERING JOB ANALYSIS

    1. PROCEDURES

    • ·What are the procedures for the task?
    • ·What is unclear about the procedures?
    • ·In what order will we use these procedures?
    • ·What is the proper timeline for these procedures?
    • ·What permits or permissions are needed for job controls?

    2. EQUIPMENT, TOOLS, DOCUMENTS

    • ·What are the right tools for the job? (software, simulators, matrixes, checklists, worksheets…)
    • ·What is the correct way to use them?
    • ·What forms will be needed for the job?
    • ·What documents will we need to produce?
    • ·What else do we need to know?

    3. INTERACTION WITH PEOPLE

    • ·What other departments need to know about this task?
    • ·Who are the personnel that need to know?
    • ·What other departments will supply information for this task?
    • ·Who are the personnel who will supply that information?
    • ·What could prevent other personnel or departments from supplying what we need?
    • ·What could prevent us from supplying what other departments need?

    4.  CHANGING THE COURSE OF WORK

    • ·What would cause us to have to stop or rearrange the job?
    • ·What would cause us to change our tools or equipment?
    • ·What would cause us to have to change our interaction with people?

    YOU HAVE THE RIGHT AND THE OBLIGATION TO

    STOP UNSAFE or UNPRODUCTIVE ACTS

  • The Stainless Steel Family – An Overview

    Stainless steel is a family of corrosion resistant steels containing chromium in which the chromium forms a passive film of chromium oxide (Cr2O3) when exposed to oxygen [1]. This phenomenon is called passivation and is seen in other metals, such as aluminium and titanium.

    The film layer is impervious to water and air and quickly reforms when the surface is scratched. This protects the metal beneath – preventing further surface corrosion.  Since the layer only forms in the presence of oxygen, corrosion-resistance can be adversely affected if the component is used in a non-oxygenated environment e.g. underwater bolts on a platform support structure.

    Such passivation only occurs if the proportion of chromium is high enough and is normally achieved with addition of at least 13% (by weight) chromium. Progressively higher levels of corrosion resistance and strength is achieved  by the addition of other alloying elements – each offering specific attributes in respect of strength and corrosion resistance.

    Classification issues

    The need to classify stainless steel has led to a fundamental problem of which method to use. Probably the best known system derives from of the Society of Automobile Engineers (SAE) e.g. 316 Cr/Ni/Mo 17/12/2. This is interpreted as stainless steel containing the proportions of 17% chromium, 12% nickel, and 2% molybdenum.

    However, the waters are somewhat muddied by a variety of international and country-based systems that include EN (European Norm); and UNS (Unified Numbering System). For example, SAE 304 Cr/Ni 18/10 stainless steel is EN 1.4301 which is UNS S30400.

    Stainless steels may also be graded into five basic families or phases determined by their crystalline structure: the stable phases austenitic or ferritic; a duplex mix of the two; the martensitic phase created when some steels are quenched from a high temperature; and precipitation-hardenable.

    Ferritic stainless steel

    In ferritic stainless steel, the iron and chromium atoms are arranged in what is termed a body-centred cubic structure in which the atoms are arranged on the corners of the cube and one in the centre (Figure 1). As well as being ferro-magnetic, ferritic stainless steel exhibits very high stress corrosion cracking resistance.

    Ferritic stainless steels are plain chromium (10.5 to 18%) grades characterized by moderate corrosion resistance and poor fabrication properties. These characteristics may be improved with the addition of molybdenum; some, aluminium or titanium.

    Austenitic stainless steel

    With the addition of nickel, the properties change dramatically. As shown (Figure 3) the atoms are re-arranged so that they occur on the corners of the cube and also in the centre of each of the faces. In this manner it becomes what is termed austenitic stainless steel.

    It can thus be seen from Table 1 that unless you are specifically looking for a ferro-magnetic material, austenitic stainless steel would be the most obvious choice. Indeed this is borne out by the fact that austenitic stainless steels account for about 70% or more of all stainless steel used worldwide – with ferritic stainless steels making up about 25%. The other families each represent less than 1% of the total market.

    Austenitic stainless steels are designated by numbers in the 200 and 300 series.

    Series 300

    The relationship between the 300 austenitic grades is shown in Figures 4.

    The basic grade 304 contains about 18% chromium and 8% nickel (often referred to as 18/8) and range through to the high alloy or ‘super austenitics’ such as 904L and 6% molybdenum grades.

    Additional elements can be added such as molybdenum, titanium or copper, to modify or improve their properties, making them suitable for many critical applications involving high temperature as well as corrosion resistance. This group of steels is also suitable for cryogenic applications because the effect of the nickel content in making the steel austenitic avoids the problems of brittleness at low temperatures, which is a characteristic of other types of steel.

    Generally, the 300 grade alloys are subject to crevice and pitting corrosion.

    Low-carbon versions, (indicated by the letter suffix L) include 304L, 316L and 317L, in which the carbon content of the alloy is below 0.03%. This reduces the effect of ‘sensitisation’ in which chromium carbides precipitate at the grain boundaries due to the high temperatures involved in welding.  The relatively high nickel content also inhibits the brittleness exhibited by ferritic materials at low temperatures and thus makes austenitic steels suitable for cryogenic applications.

    200 series

    We have seen earlier how the addition of nickel is used in the creation of the classic chrome-nickel 300 series austenitic stainless steel.

    The reduced nickel content of the 200 series chrome-manganese grades makes them significantly cheaper. However, depending on their chemistry, they also offer good formability (ductility) and/or strength.  Indeed, certain grades (201, 202 and 205 series) even offer about 30% higher yield strength than the classic 304-series chrome-nickel grade – allowing designers to cut weight (Table C.2).

    Reducing nickel, on the other hand, reduces the maximum chromium content possible in the alloy. Less chromium means less corrosion resistance and a consequent narrowing of the range of applications for which the material is suitable.

    A word of warning comes from the International Stainless Steel Forum (ISSF). Continuous pressure to cut costs, especially from the Asian market, has resulted in the development of austenitic grades ever lower in nickel and chromium, often not covered by international codes or specifications. In fact, numerous chrome-manganese grades are company-specific and identified simply by a title given to them by the producer.

    Duplex stainless steels

    Duplex stainless steels [6] are a mixture of austenite and ferrite microstructures that combine some of the features of each class:

    • resistance to stress corrosion cracking  – but inferior to ferritic steel;
    • superior toughness to ferritic steel – but inferior to austenitic steel;
    • roughly twice the strength of austenitic steel;
    • superior resistance to pitting, crevice corrosion and stress corrosion cracking;
    • high resistance to chloride ions attack; and
    • high weldability.

    These features are achieved by adding less nickel than would be necessary for making a fully austenitic stainless steel. Thus, Grade 2304 comprises 23% chromium and 4% nickel whilst Grade 2205 comprises 22% chromium and 5% nickel – with both grades containing further minor alloying additions.

    On the negative side, austenitic-ferritic duplex stainless steels are only usable between temperature limits of about -50°C and 300°C – outside which they suffer reduced toughness.

    Martensitic stainless steel

    Named after the German metallurgist, Adolf Martens, the martensitic Grade 400 series (Figure 5) are low carbon (0.1–1%), low nickel (less than 2%) steels containing chromium (12 to 14%) and molybdenum (0.2–1%).

    Stainless steels hardened by transformation to martensite are tempered to give the desired engineering properties. At high temperatures they have an austenitic structure that is transformed into martensitic structure upon cooling to room temperature. Unfortunately, this tempering can influence corrosion susceptibility. For example, corrosion susceptibility of type 420 stainless steel is at its maximum when the alloy is tempered at temperatures in the range of 450° to 600°C. So, aalthough not as corrosion-resistant as the 200 and 300 classes, martensitic stainless steels are magnetic, extremely strong (if not a little brittle), highly machinable, and can be hardened by heat treatment.

    Martensitic stainless steels are subject to both uniform and non-uniform attack in seawater. And the incubation time for non-uniform attack in even weak chlorides is often only a few hours or days.

    Precipitation-hardening martensitic stainless steels

    These chromium-  and nickel-containing steels can be precipitation hardened to develop very high tensile strengths. Precipitation-hardening stainless steels are usually designated by a trade name rather than by their AISI 600 series designations.

    The most common grade in this group is ‘17-4 PH’, also known as Grade 630, with a composition of 17% chromium, 4% nickel, 4% copper and 0.3% niobium. The main advantage of these steels is that they can be supplied in the ‘solution treated’ condition – in which state the steel is just machinable. Following machining, forming, etc. the steel can be hardened by a single, fairly low temperature ‘ageing’ heat treatment that causes no distortion of the component.

    Precipitation hardening generally results in a slight increase in corrosion susceptibility and an increased susceptibility to hydrogen embrittlement.

    By: Mick Crabtree

    References

    1. T. Sourmail and H. K. D. H. Bhadeshia, ‘Stainless Steels’, University of Cambridge.

    2. Nabil Al-Khirdaji, ‘Stainless Steel Family’, Kappa Associates International.

    3. ‘Stainless Steel and Corrosion’, ArcelorMittal, Stainless Europe.

    4. A.U. Malik, M. Kutty, Nadeem Ahmad Siddiqi, Ismaeel N. Andijani, and Shahreer Ahmad, ‘Corrosion Studies on SS 316 L in low pH high Chloride product water medium’, 1990.

    5. ‘The Stainless Steel Family’, International Stainless Steel Forum.

    6. API Technical Report 938-C: ‘Use of Duplex Stainless Steels in the Oil Refining Industry’.

  • What is Mentoring?

    What is Mentoring?

    In this Tip of the Month, we explore how process safety competency can be enhanced through mentoring programs.

    This TOTM is the paper that was developed by JMC Instructor/Consultants Clyde Young and Keith Hodges presentation at the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) 8th Global Conference on Process Safety in April, 2012.  The paper will also be published in the AIChE (American Institute of Chemical Engineering) publication, “Process Safety Progress.”

    Commit to Process Safety is the first pillar mentioned in “Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety Management”, published by CCPS.  This pillar is supported by five elements.  One of the elements is Process Safety Competency, which is associated with efforts to maintain, improve and broaden knowledge and expertise.

    In Greek mythology, Odysseus, King of Ithaca went to fight in the Trojan Wars. Before he left, he entrusted his son Telemachus to the care of his old and trusted friend MENTOR. It was some ten years before father and son were reunited and during this time the development and care of his son was with Mentor.

    What is often missing from historical accounts is that it is Athene, the Goddess of Wisdom, who appears to Telemachus in the likeness of Mentor and gives advice, encouragement and spiritual insight.

    Since then, the word Mentor has become synonymous with trusted advisor, friend and teacher, a wise person.

    Demographic studies of the oil and gas processing industry indicate that a large number of people are retiring and being replaced by younger, less experienced personnel.  This presents a challenge to the industry.  A wise mountaineer once stated, “Good judgment comes from bad experiences.” With the influx of less experienced personnel, it would be shameful to have their good judgment developed from their bad experiences.  Especially since these bad experiences can be catastrophic.

    Organizations in the industry have spent considerable resources recruiting the best talent available and most have a competency development program that these new workers enter.  The program will generally include a step to have a more experienced person provide feedback on the worker to assess competency in the job. Well-developed and resourced competency development programs will have a Mentor assigned to the worker.

    What does this really mean and how can an organization insure that process safety competency is developed in all personnel, even if process safety activities are not the primary role?

    This TOTM will provide some guidance and best practices for establishing Mentoring programs with an emphasis on developing process safety competency in the younger, less experienced workforce.

    The role of Mentor involves teaching, helping, protecting, challenging, motivating, guiding, coaching, listening, and providing career guidance; it falls short of counseling.  Counseling is the provision of professional psychological help and advice and chosen Mentors would be foolhardy to attempt such a role without extensive training.

    Mentoring is usually a formal or informal relationship between two people, a Mentor (usually and preferably outside the Mentee’s area of supervision) and a Mentee.  The Mentor can also be provided from an external organization. This can be preferable especially if there is any hint of competition between the Mentors and Mentees (e.g. working in the same department as peers).  There are different rules of engagement if the external option is taken and this is outside the scope of this paper.  Peer Mentoring can be a useful option, especially if a peer Mentor has specific skills and qualifications.

    Using a Mentee’s supervisor within a discipline should be avoided as there could be a conflict of interest.  The Mentor may be Mentoring one day and disciplining the next, This is not conducive to building trust, which is an important ingredient in the Mentoring process.

    Mentoring should not be substituted for conventional classroom or computer-moderated training. It enhances traditional training by allowing the Mentee to learn from experienced colleagues within the working environment.

    Choosing a Mentor

    The choice of Mentors is an important aspect of a program and managers should first be satisfied that a Mentor not only has the required technical skills, but also has the ability to convey those to others in an efficient and effective way. Competency associated with Mentoring skills does not necessarily come naturally to everyone with highly competent technical skills.  A key skill to insure effective process safety is communication with all disciplines that could have an impact on the process.

    Mentor Program

    It is foolhardy to think that just putting together a pool of people as Mentors and pairing them with Mentees is going to be an effective way to put a Mentor program together.  It takes planning and needs structure.  There has to be an organizational aim for the program with measurable objectives.  The Mentor should be provided with these and a list of roles and responsibilities, which they should fully comprehend.

    There should be a selection process for Mentors and organizations must recognize that a training program may have to be created for selected Mentors.

    Ideally the Mentee should be able to select the Mentor from a pool of people in the organization; management, the training department or HR should not pair them.  Mentors should have the option to refuse the role should they feel that it would not be appropriate.

    Mentoring and Process Safety

    A Mentoring program is not to be approached in a haphazard fashion if the goal is to develop competent personnel.  A Mentoring program is much like a process safety management system.  The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety Management (RBPSM) defines a management system as, “A formally established and documented set of activities designed to produce specific results in a consistent manner on a sustainable basis.”  The Mentoring program should be formalized, documented and designed to produce specific results.  The specific results are competent personnel associated with process safety.

    Mentees within a program may have been chosen because they are targeted to fill a key role within the organization.  This role could be a technical position that requires narrow skills in a field or a supervisory position of either engineering personnel or operations personnel.  The competency levels associated with process safety that are required will be highly dependent on the role in the organization.  The Mentor/Mentee relationship should keep this in mind as the process progresses.

    An effective Mentoring program that includes process safety as a key component will yield numerous benefits to the organization.  A Mentor with wide professional and technical expertise should have considerable experience in areas that involve process safety.  A Mentor that truly understands the concepts of risk based process safety will be invaluable to a Mentee with less experience.  Consider the pillars of RBPSM and some of the elements within each pillar.

    Commit to Process Safety

    Elements of this pillar include:

    • Process safety culture
    • Compliance with standards
    • Process safety competency
    • Workforce involvement
    • Stakeholder outreach

    A simple definition of culture is, “How we do things around here.”  Organizations strive to develop a learning culture that seeks hazards and solutions on a continuous basis.  It is imperative that Mentees are provided awareness level training on the organization’s culture and the Mentor will be given training on how to act as the example.  Two significant benefits will come from this.  The Mentors will examine their own actions within the culture and insure that they are setting a good example.  The Mentee will question why and how activities are accomplished and learn his/her role within the organization’s culture, which should accelerate the Mentees contribution through self-awareness.

    It will be difficult for a less experienced worker to learn the things required to insure compliance with all applicable standards.  An effective Mentor should always guide the Mentee toward the correct answer associated with compliance but not necessarily answer the question of compliance.  The guidance and allowing the Mentee to find the answer will insure that the learning associated with compliance will be retained long after the answer is discovered.

    Process safety competency of the Mentee will be enhanced significantly, but only if the Mentor insures that the Mentee is directed to the appropriate resources for this.  The Mentor does not necessarily have to be considered a process safety expert.  The Mentor does have to be aware that some process safety issues require a level of expertise that will be found elsewhere.  And sometimes those resources may be outside the organization.

    For a process safety management system to thrive, staff members at all levels of the organization must take an active role.  The role taken needs to be identified and metrics established to show participation in the role.  A Mentor can provide guidance and suggestions so that the Mentee is consistently working toward the goals of the process safety management system. Appropriately timed reviews of progress associated with established process safety metrics should be scheduled and conducted.

    Stakeholders include outside contractors, shareholders, community members and partners in joint ventures.  A Mentee may be involved with negotiations and planning activities associated with all kinds of stakeholders.  A Mentor’s experience in the industry and the organization can be very useful to insure that all stakeholder interests are addressed.

    Understand Hazards and Risks

    Elements of this pillar include:

    • Process knowledge management
    • Hazard identification and risk analysis

    Development of a Mentee’s competency in this pillar of RBPSM could be the Mentor’s most important role. Insuring that the correct process knowledge is developed and managed appropriately is a critical activity that the Mentee strives for. There is no need for a Mentee to learn from mistakes if a Mentor can provide clear guidance on this pillar.

    It is within these two elements that mistakes can lead to catastrophic events.  Having an incorrectly sized relief valve installed in a process or not anticipating the consequences of failure of controls is not acceptable. The Mentor and Mentee should routinely conduct discussions about these elements.

    Contract services are utilized a great deal for design of new and modified facilities.  A Mentor who has significant experience in this area can provide the Mentee advice and guidance for overseeing these projects.  Oversight by a qualified company representative will insure that all issues associated with a project have been addressed.

    Providing resources during the conduct of Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) studies is a challenge for many organizations. This is especially true considering the demographics of the industry at this time. More experienced personnel have moved on. PHA team members with significant experience are critical to the success of a PHA.  A Mentee who is assigned to a PHA team may or may not work side by side with their Mentor.  If the assigned Mentor is also a member of the PHA team, this may prove advantageous.  As the role of Mentor is to provide guidance and direction to new and developing staff, the PHA is an excellent environment to do just that.  The structure of the PHA provides an opportunity to guide the Mentee in the proper way to identify hazards, develop measures to mitigate those hazards and work as a team member in a formalized setting.

    Manage Risk

    Within this pillar, a Mentee will benefit from the guidance of an experienced Mentor to become proficient at what might be considered the day-to-day activities associated with their job.  Elements are:

    • Procedures
    • Safe work practices
    • Asset integrity
    • Contractors
    • Training and performance
    • Management of change
    • Operational readiness
    • Conduct of operations
    • Emergency management

    Sometimes organizations will assign a younger, less experienced person to a supervisory position in operations to “season” them. Studies have shown that a great number of incidents occur during normal operations.  Having a Mentor with significant operations experience will accelerate the “seasoning” process and insure that the problems associated with day-to-day activities do not lead to a catastrophic incident.

    Working in operations supervision will certainly expose the Mentee to many issues associated with personal interaction. Dealing with people may be one of the most difficult tasks undertaken. Having the ear of a Mentor can be helpful as the Mentee develops his/her skills in this area.

    Learn From Experience

    There is no reason that a young professional cannot learn from the experience of others. To pass along the experience and knowledge that has been gained over the years is the focus of a Mentoring program.   Hopefully, the Mentee will not have to experience a catastrophic incident to learn from experience.

    Elements within this pillar are:

    • Incident investigation
    • Measurement
    • Audits
    • Management review and continuous improvement

    Having a Mentor available to help review near miss reports, incident investigations, audit findings and metrics associated with process safety can provide the Mentee with a “cold eye” review of issues that are the Mentee’s responsibility to address.  Often a wiser, more experienced Mentor will have experienced some of the same things that are being discovered under the Mentee’s watch.  In this case, issues should be able to be addressed quickly and more efficiently.

    Troubleshooting

    All processes within the industries we work have been designed to operate in a specified manner. This manner includes specific temperatures, pressures, flow rates and levels.  Defining these specific parameters establishes “normal” for these processes.  Operating processes in a “normal” manner reduces the likelihood of a catastrophic incident.  Deviation from “normal” is not acceptable and identifying this deviation and taking the steps required to return to normal requires experience and knowledge. This is known as troubleshooting. Process safety management is a system that establishes “normal” and provides directions on maintaining “normal”. Personnel with effective troubleshooting skills will also work efficiently within an organization’s process safety management system.

    A formalized, well established Mentoring program for younger, less experienced personnel entering the business enhances everyone’s troubleshooting skills.  The Mentee has someone (the Mentor) available to query about issues seen and the Mentor is challenged to insure the advice and guidance provided is correct and useful.

    Attaining high-level competency in a job requires training and then performing the job for a period of time.  Accelerating the path to high-level competency is a significant goal of a formalized Mentoring program.

    Conclusion

    At the beginning of this TOTM, it was stated that the word Mentor has become synonymous with trusted advisor, friend and teacher, a wise person. Process safety management has become synonymous for reducing the risk associated with the activities performed in our industries.

    Risk is often viewed differently from individual to individual.  A person’s perception of risk may change with familiarity.  Having a trusted advisor for younger, less experienced personnel, to help identify and provide suggestions for mitigation of hazards, in all their forms, is a strong competency development tool for any organization.  Personnel will be developed quicker and more efficiently. Experienced personnel are one of a company’s most valuable resources.  Acting as a Mentor can be the best use of this resource and will provide a challenge that some people thrive on.

    Any organization that truly strives for a generative safety culture should do whatever it takes to implement a process safety-Mentoring program. The benefits will be seen and reaped for years to come.

    To learn more about managing process safety systems, we suggest attending our PetroSkills HSE course,  HS 45- Risk Based Process Safety Management.

    To enhance process safety engineering skills we suggest any of the JMC foundation courses or our, PS 4 – Process Safety Engineering course.

    John M. Campbell Consulting (JMCC) offers consulting expertise on this subject and many others. For more information about the services JMCC provides, visit our website at www.jmcampbellconsulting.com, or email us at consulting@jmcampbell.com.

    By: Clyde Young and Keith Hodges

     

  • Maintenance Fallacy: Focusing on Maintenance Planning and Scheduling and Reliability Will Increase Reliability Quickly

    Is it possible to increase reliability by simply enhancing or focusing on planning and scheduling? I don’t think so. I remember the old saying “which comes first the chicken or the egg”? Most people, including myself until a couple of years ago, would have said that in order to achieve results quickly, planning and scheduling have to be a major focus.

    Look closely at the P-F Curve. Where along that curve your PM/PdM (Preventive Maintenance/Predictive Maintenance) program detected a failure or a defect determines whether any true scheduling and planning can take place. When you know a defect has been introduced and a failure is imminent, do you find it so close to failure that true planning and scheduling has little chance to work? The best way to make planning and scheduling truly work effectively is to implement a maintenance strategy that identifies the start of equipment failure, or as some call a “defect” as soon as possible using some type of Predictive Technology. Review the graphic below and see where you think would be the best place to plan a job.

    Figure 1

    If it takes an organization 2-7 weeks to plan a job, depending on their maturity in planning, and another 2-6 weeks to schedule, depending on operations scheduled, can you see that you are not supporting a Proactive Maintenance Plan? You are supporting a Run-to-Failure Maintenance plan without even meaning to.  Most companies implement and focus efforts in planning and scheduling yet still experience frustration with this issue.  Stop wasting time with a maintenance program that is ineffective and drive your planning and scheduling success by first improving your earlier identification of defects and work through proactive Condition Monitoring. Only then will planning and scheduling allow you to reap massive rewards.

    By: Ricky Smith, CMRP
    Instructor/Consultant

  • The Truth about Why Your Preventive Maintenance Program Isn’t Working

    Does it annoy you that in spite of regularly performing Preventive Maintenance (PM) on your equipment it continues to breakdown?  Some may call this insanity – Continuing to do the same thing over and over, expecting a different result.

    If you sat down and graphed out your companies’ PM labor hours versus emergency labor hours what would you find? In the chart below we find PM labor hours flat however emergency labor hours rising which indicates the PM program is not effective.

    Graph

    Have you ever heard of “Killer PMs”? These are PMs which are intrusive and are known to quite commonly cause premature failure of an asset.  One such example might be taking a pump out of service to inspect coupling shaft alignment.  Consider carefully that this inspection could be easily performed using Infrared Thermography or vibration analysis without shutting down the pump.  Have you ever seen someone lubricate an electric motor with sealed bearings? These PMs sound unnecessary don’t they? But they happen every day.

    Image

    Is this happening to you?

    PMs can also absorb resources which could be used for work that would actually improve your reliability. Remember the challenge of reliability is the detection of a defect early enough that a part or equipment change out or repair can be planned and scheduled in a proactive state.

    The example below displays the P-F Curve where the “P” is the point where a defect can first be detected maintenance strategy.

    Graph

    In the graphic above, it is important to notice that Predictive Maintenance allows one to detect a defect closer to “P” than Preventive Maintenance.

    “It Isn’t What You Know That Will Kill You,
    It Is What You Don’t Know That Will”

    Image

    Did you realize that most Preventive Maintenance programs have not been engineered, they just evolved?  With every regulation or component failure, both the number of PM tasks and the frequency of the tasks being executed increases, until it consumes 30-50% of your workforce and you are lulled into a false sense of security that you have evolved into a Best Practice or World Class organization.” Let’s be clear, it is impossible to evolve into Best Practice, it must be carefully engineered.

    In fact, after numerous benchmarking studies, data states factually that most maintenance organizations are doing almost exactly the same type of maintenance they’ve always done.  Now here’s the scary part.  A closer look at all Preventive Maintenance (PM) tasks reveals that on average:

    • 30% don’t add value and should be eliminated
    • 30% should be replaced with Predictive Maintenance (PdM) tasks
    • 30% could add value if re-engineered

    What that means to you is, less than 10% of your PMs are truly adding value as written.  Or, in other words, potentially, 90% of your PM tasks should be eliminated or changed.  What’s worse, when you conduct unnecessary, invasive maintenance, you actually introduce variability and potential defects into your asset and process reliability.  That’s right! You are actually causing some failures and you don’t even know it!

    What to do about the problem?

    Striking the right balance of Preventive and Predictive Maintenance is absolutely necessary and it offers a rare opportunity to save millions of dollars through:

    • Lower maintenance costs
    • Lower spare parts inventories
    • Lower energy consumption
    • Better safety performance
    • Increased throughput capacity

    Achieving these results is not easy.  For starters, you need to have a common vision, a basic implementation strategy and a clear understanding of what’s required for success. Let’s look at the 6 most important steps you can take to begin achieving your reliability goals.

    1. Receive training in PM/PdM Best Practices.
    2. Update your functional hierarchy so that you have a clear understanding of the machines in your facility and their component configuration.
    3. Conduct a Criticality Assessment on your assets. You know, the assessment you used to help determine maintenance strategy, prioritize work orders and make better overall risk management decisions.
    4. Develop a complete understanding of the failure modes that are present or may be present in your components.  These failure modes come from 2 places: 1) the inherent design of the machine and 2) the operating context in which they are used on a daily basis.
    5. Perform a Preventive Maintenance Evaluation (PME) where you identify each PM Task and any connection it may have to a failure mode you are experiencing. Are the PMs causing the failure or addressing it?  If they aren’t addressing and reducing failures, then they add no value.
    6. Then believe in the outcome of your PME.  If it says a PM adds value, do it!  If it shows it doesn’t, then re-write/re-engineer it so it does, re-assign it to the appropriate PdM Technologies or get rid of it! See the chart below.
    Table

    PetroSkills and JM Campbell offers workshops this year on this specific subject, “Introduction to Condition Monitoring” in Orlando, FL and Fort McMurray, Alberta, Canada (go to www.petroskills.com) or if you are interested in attending a one hour webinar on this subject contact Ricky Smith at smithr@alliedreliability.com. The webinar is scheduled for July 25, 2008 by JM Campbell and PetroSkills.

    By Ricky Smith CMRP, PetroSkills Reliability Discipline Leader